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Abstract 
What is to be done about the thing? There is a growing interest in contemporary philosophy 
in re-considering the ontological status of the object – traditionally considered the passive 
substrate of human experience. This paper argues that, if we treat the object qua object 
seriously as an area of inquiry and attempt to accord it –  à la Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter 
– a certain amount of agency, we can come to see it as both unique in its capacities and more 
than superficially enabling of subjective cognition. By using Jane Bennett’s aforementioned 
text, Clark and Chalmers’ extended mind theory, and phenomenological description 
borrowing from Merleau-Ponty, I argue that it is possible to formulate an intuitive and 
livable account of a vital matter that functions as memory and that, if adopted, could 
contribute much toward rectifying problematic attitudes about environmental awareness and 
thus practices.  
Keywords 
vital materialism, extended mind theory, phenomenology, Jane Bennett, Andy Clark, David 
Chalmers, Merleau-Ponty, materialism, memory, ontology 
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O irrevocable 
river 
of things: 
no one can say 
that I loved 
only 
fish, 
or the plants of the jungle and the field, 
that I loved 
only 
those things that leap and climb, desire, and survive. 
It’s not true: 
many things conspired 
to tell me the whole story. 
Not only did they touch me, 
or my hand touched them: 
they were 
so close 
that they were a part 
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of my being, 
they were so alive with me 
that they lived half my life 
and will die half my death. 
– Pablo Neruda, Odes to Common Things 
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1 Introduction (What Could the Matter Be?) 
Of all of the things that seem intuitive and immediate to us, the “thing” is a choice 
example – so choice, in fact, that it has just slipped into our language in the form of 
colloquial vernacular consciously unbeknownst to us, a surreptitious answer to an 
implicit question not yet posed in the form of quod erat demonstrandum. Each object 
manifests before our gaze as something apparently wholly given, readily accessible, and 
with no opaque shroud of mystery to interfere with our ability as subjects to engage with 
it for our private means. This is not to say that objects are declarative for us. Part of our 
common sense understanding of the object is its fundamental inertial quality – a 
characterizing passivity and reactivity that precludes the possibility of vocality and thus 
firmly entrenches the ontic in a domain cleanly divided from the ontological. 
Furthermore, there is a way in which this absence of vocality is taken up by us, the 
subject, as a testament to the veneer of ineffability that adorns the object, lending it an air 
of reticence or even intractability that is at odds with the open transparency described 
above. However, this reticence or intractability is the same quality that spurs the spirit of 
natural investigation to which the object, with little protest, yields – a fact well-
corroborated by the many-limbed and densely populated enterprise of scientific inquiry. 
Quiet though it may be, the object is generous in its offerings. In its natural state as 
something ready-to-hand, it is always an answer and never a question; it is never 
expressively complex, only materially (compositionally) so. 
Yet the subject/object dichotomy is of an old and rich vintage, loathe to stay out of the 
spotlight for long, and making appearances across a vast swathe of disciplines in a variety 
of both traditional and chimeric forms. Speculative realism and its subset of object-
oriented ontology are merely some of the more recent, explicit, and philosophically-
geared of these appearances. The liminal space between subject and object has a large 
measure of affective and intellectual grip, and echoes of this concern float across the 
scholarly landscape as a persistent and pervasive existential fugue. A great deal of the 
“meat” of this particular dichotomy comes from contestation around what it is that 
constitutes the fundamental difference(s) between the subject and the object – how we 
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can rest assured, at the end of the day, that there is some kind of quiddity amongst 
subjects that makes us radically other than objects. Philosophers tend to refer to this 
intersection – or, rather, the shifting sands that underlie its marker of differentiation, and 
the inferences that can be made as a consequence of this shifting – as the “subject-object 
problem.” While formulations of this relationship vary widely, our interactions with our 
environment as a species attest to the fact that we long for the object to show its face as a 
form of absolute alterity. Not only does such an act provide us with a foothold in the 
process of (self-)identity construction, but it also undergirds a larger narrative that can be 
exploited systematically to suit the whims of social, political, and/or cultural needs – 
whether these needs be catered to in good or bad faith. We use matter for subsistence in 
the form of nourishment and shelter; we refine and re-constitute it through forms of 
aesthetic expression; we attribute it with meaning through the projection of individual 
experiences and values. All of these activities have a great deal of instrumental value for 
us. However, a note of caution may be warranted here, conveyed through an observation 
– the fact that the way that we talk about things not only carries semantic force, but a 
much stronger, more insidious, constitutive force of productive power, in a somewhat 
Foucauldian sense.1 If we may borrow his observation that power subtends and suffuses 
all relations, how can the material body in abstracto escape it? And how can these 
material discourses be incised and re-appropriated for application to social bodies? 
Such a view is seen by some as inherently anthropocentric and, accordingly, problematic. 
Deep ecologists, for example, see the natural world, which we will (given the breadth of 
our interest) view as the sum of objects or materiality outside of the direct manipulation 
of human projects, as worthy of moral consideration regardless of their influence on 
human values or needs. While this position does not typically forbid the human use of the 
natural world in order to satisfy the requirements of life, it sees these requirements of life 
                                                 
 1. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, vol. 1 (New York: 
Random House, 1990), 92-96.  
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as just one set of needs on par with others in a biocentric ethical model. 2 Regardless of 
one’s position on the relative merits of this breed of egalitarian environmental 
philosophy, which is admittedly fairly radical, it does introduce a valuable note of 
axiological humility into the picture. By treating our environment as more than a crust of 
reality for human appropriation, deep ecology invites a dialogue on not only what is 
important to us, but why it is important to us, and how the reasons that compel value 
deserve the same attention given to the attainment of value-respecting practices. 
Two overarching problems appear in this account, however, when we consider its 
pertinence to an investigation of the object. The first is that any biocentric model, by 
definition, can only extend to those whose constitution is biological (from “bios”: any 
form of organic, i.e. living, matter). This necessarily excludes the object qua object. Deep 
ecology may succeed in escaping a human-slanted perspective, but only by fractionally 
expanding our appreciation of what we might think of as the élan vital to include those 
organisms whose unique functions and interactions characterize and sustain our 
ecologies, and in so doing, our worldly habitats as we know them. This point segues into 
a second. The reason why this quality of living seems so integral to our ethical 
frameworks is because of an attitude that comes naturally to us. During the time when 
deep ecology was still in its nascent stages, E. O. Wilson was popularizing a notion called 
“biophilia”: in his words, the “innate tendency to focus on life and lifelike processes.”3 
The most extreme form of biophilia that we must contend with, of course, is 
anthropocentrism (our natural self-interest), but this can be expanded to include all living 
matter (animal and vegetable, but sadly not mineral). While there is no absolute 
agreement on the motivating factors behind this innate tendency, Wilson and later 
likeminded scholars ascribe it to a biological impetus and its capability to “[confer] 
                                                 
 2. Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered 
(Layton, Utah: Gibbs Smith, 1985), 70-71. 
 3. E. O. Wilson, Biophilia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 1. 
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distinctive advantages in the human struggle to persist, adapt, and thrive as a species.”4 In 
other words, to the extent to which it is accurate to say that one can be genetically 
“hardwired” (since gene expression is a tricky thing), humans have a predisposition 
toward a manner of thinking that intuitively favours consideration of those elements of 
their surroundings that exhibit the dynamic properties of life.  
We might conclude, then, that deep ecology “cuts too close to the bone” to offer much to 
a focused investigation of the object, but that it does so as a symptom of a greater and 
deeply-ingrained practice that is difficult to elude. This observation can serve to suggest a 
methodological point for us. If we want to talk about the object even-handedly, we must 
do so in a way that respects the limitations that we have in recognizing and ascribing 
value without, as a consequence, doing an injustice to the object by commandeering it for 
human purposes. This, then, is the task list set before us. We must find a way to a) get at 
the object proper that b) investigates its intrinsic value without c) failing to recognize its 
quiddity or d) subsuming it below an overriding self-interest, but that nonetheless e) 
minimizes the obstacles posed by our inherent biophilia. What we need is to examine the 
archive of the subject-object problem to locate a framework capable of examining the 
object fairly without overstepping our epistemological and axiological parameters.  
Of course, tracing a historiography of discourse on the subject/object relationship would, 
interpreted liberally, entail a far-reaching project well outside of the scope of the present 
undertaking. Such an effort would easily stretch as far back in history as Aristotle and his 
differentiation between the nutritive, sensitive, and rational soul in Book III of his work 
De Anima, where these rational faculties – built on those “lower” levels of soul that 
inhabit plant and animal life – provide an essence of the human, out of which he 
                                                 
 4. Stephen R. Kellert, Kinship to Mastery: Biophilia in Human Evolution and 
Development (Washington: Island Press, 1997), 3. 
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constructs both ontological and ethical categories and prescriptions, respectively.5 This 
would then lead us to draw a line through many extremely broad philosophical 
movements throughout intellectual history: idealism, which posits the fundamental 
immateriality of reality; realism, which contrarily asserts that the external world that we 
perceive is independent of the mind; skepticism, which withdraws from the question of 
reality through a suspension of belief; one could continue with minimal effort. Each of 
these doctrines is heavily weighted with a number of highly nuanced “strains” or 
subtypes, each of which inhabits a unique territory in terms of its place – not infrequently 
disputed or qualified – within the larger dialogue. Each of these doctrines offers a wealth 
of both explications and implications in terms of both the identity (i.e. ontological status) 
and valuation (i.e. worth) of materiality within the dominant Weltanschauung. Yet each 
of these doctrines merely glosses over the most blatantly metaphysical aspects of the 
subject/object relationship, and in itself only does so with the broadest of brushstrokes. 
Vast, paradigm-shifting ideologies exist that take materiality qua social good to be the 
crux of its elaborate framework – take, for example, historical materialism, which 
contends as part of its central thesis that human nature (or “human species-being”) is 
determined by the uniquely universal way in which we, as a species, apply our 
consciousness and will to productive life-activity, or “life-engendering life.”6 Part of 
what grants this intersection so much purchase is that it represents a seed of human 
interest that takes root seemingly wherever the winds of self-reflexivity blow it. Attuned 
to these concerns, one can easily see the intellectual landscape readily take shape as a 
pastoral in which the thing cultivated is not livestock or foodstuffs, but the thing. 
                                                 
5. Aristotle, “On the Soul,” in Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
Translation, ed. J. Barnes, vol. 1, Bollingen series (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983), 641-692. 
6. Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” in The 
Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), 76. 
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This being said, it becomes clear that some engagements of objecthood are more directly 
pertinent than others, if we flesh out what is at the heart of our interest. A number of 
statements can be made here. To reinvoke this image of the chimera, we might argue that 
what seems to form the Gordian knot of contemporary literature on the topic is the node 
in which ontology and politics converge – a philosophy known as, naturally, “political 
ontology.” Contributions to this field are anything but homogenous, representing a 
diversity of priorities as encompassing as each of its constituent signifiers. Before we can 
agree on what comprises a political ontology, we must have consensus on what 
intellectual matter, precisely, makes up “the political” and “the ontological” – answers 
that, while easy enough to circumscribe through a combination of etymology and 
discourse analysis, are nearly impossible to pinpoint, since this would necessarily require 
a level of reduction or compression of conceptual content. This is not to suggest that the 
terminology that we are invoking is loose or “woolly,” but merely that it exists as a nexus 
of intersecting discussions, each negotiating its distinctive material in such a way that 
their juncture signifies less a unified meaning than a kind of diagrammatic union. In 
political science, for example, this term indicates political dimensions of the ontological, 
but its aim is not to examine, through a political lens, the imposed boundaries in 
ontological thought; rather, to be immersed in the ontological is to offer what the 
discipline terms “second-order” explanations, “self-referential, reflexive and ‘meta’,” that 
delimit and investigate the margins of ontological territory as “the world as political 
scientists assume it to be,” a distinct if hereditary outgrowth of its philosophical lineage.7  
From a neo-materialist standpoint, however, political ontology can refer to something 
quite different: the sense in which ontology (taken here to be the study of being and its 
categories, naturally including materiality, sensu lato) is intrinsically bound up with the 
political. This term has not received an unequivocal acceptance into the disciplinary 
lexicon, containing as it does what appears prima facie to be an insoluble paradox; when 
                                                 
7. Liam Stanley, “Rethinking the Definition and Role of Ontology in Political 
Science,” Politics 32, no. 2 (2012): 94. 
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it is welcomed into the fold, it remains characterized by sundry positions and 
methodologies. If we take politics to be, in its barest sense, “theories or practice of 
government or administration,” such an idea might justifiably be considered opaque at 
best, and nonsensical at worst.8 Furthermore, seeing that our interest in ontology is in the 
liminal space between the object and the subject, the fact that there is a natural and 
unassailable limit point that we are confronted with any time that we try to, as subjects, 
achieve an intimate epistemological bond with objects is a germane one. As Levi Bryant 
concisely comments, we are “subjects, and, as subjects, cannot get outside of our own 
minds to determine whether our representations [of objects] map on to any sort of 
external reality.”9 It thus becomes difficult to conceive of how, even if we tentatively 
accept this as-yet nebulous notion of political ontology, how we can find a voice to 
express a politics concerned with something that we have already recognized as radically 
other than ourselves.  
But these two challenges are not insurmountable. In the first case, what is required is 
merely a reconsideration of the word “govern” that provides the basis of politics. To 
govern: this is to “rule with authority, esp. with the authority of a sovereign; to direct and 
control the actions and affairs of (a people, a state or its members), whether despotically 
or constitutionally; to rule or regulate the affairs of (a body of men, corporation); to 
command the garrison of (a fort).”10 Is it really an impossible act to extend these actions 
– ruling, directing, controlling, regulating, and commanding – to the realm of the 
material? It may not seem intuitive to do so, but we might comment that, not only do the 
                                                 
8. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “politics,” accessed December 1, 2014, 
http://www.oed.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/view/Entry/237575?redirectedFrom=politics. 
9. Levi R. Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities 
Press, 2011), 14. 
10. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “govern,” accessed December 1, 2014, 
http://www.oed.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/view/Entry/80304. 
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notions of personhood or citizenship not enter explicitly into the denotation of 
“government” and thus “politics,” but these very notions are themselves hotly contested 
to this day insomuch as they fashion critical links to moral standing – and furthermore 
carry with them a long and mutable past, heavily sedimented with political interest.11 One 
might further argue that, were one inclined to interpret this word liberally as we have 
requested, it may fit the definition à la lettre, but only at the cost of betraying its semantic 
“spirit.” To govern over anything other than subjects that form a cohesive collective may 
no longer be paradoxical, but nor can it be deployed in language meaningfully; at best, it 
seems like a loose metaphor for instrumental usage of resources. Against this, however, 
we can suggest that we may again be facing a question of semantics: what it means to be 
a subject, and what it is that belongs to the subject both essentially and exclusively, that 
renders it eligible for participation in the realm of “the political.” Pursuing this line of 
inquiry is no small task, but for now, perhaps we can simply note that the exploration of a 
liminal space between the subject and the object cracks open the possibility of previously 
unforeseen commonalities that are worthy of our attention. This is also a welcome place 
for Jacques Rancière’s comment that “[w]hat is proper to politics is thus lost at the outset 
if politics is thought of as a specific way of living. Politics cannot be defined on the basis 
of any pre-existing subject. The political 'difference' that makes it possible to think its 
subject must be sought in the form of its relation. … If there is something 'proper' to 
politics, it consists entirely in this relationship which is not a relationship between 
subjects, but one between two contradictory terms through which a subject is defined.”12 
                                                 
11. While the most obvious examples of this come from historical struggles for 
racial and gender equality, one can – regardless of their position on the matter – also 
consider the discourse on abortion and the legal status of the fetus for evidence that 
personhood is not a fixed concept. 
 12. Jacques Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” trans. Davide Panagia and Rachel 
Bowlby, Theory & Event 5, no. 3 (2001): 4. 
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In the second case, the problem seems to essentially reside in the fact that we have 
trouble reconciling the idea of dealing in the coin of the political – that which is 
inextricably intertwined with authority, power, and constraint – as an act of vocal 
representation on behalf of a body that, although acknowledged as deserving of 
consideration through our act of representation, is forever barred from participatory 
feedback in light of an essential feature of its identity. The value of and right to self-
representation is so fully entrenched in our ethical beliefs that it feels unnatural to 
consciously adopt a practice that we know from the start will remain incompatible with 
these fundamental principles. However, it is important to realize that this is something 
that we as societies do all the time. It is a necessary if unfortunate consequence of the 
gulf between descriptive states of affairs and prescriptive ethical mandates – the fact that 
the conditions of life cannot always line up with ideal circumstances for making moral 
choices. To say that we should have a hands-off policy in regards to consideration of 
those who cannot speak for themselves is to condemn, to give a handful of obvious cases, 
both the infant and the invalid. To be uncertain as to whether or not something is a best 
practice does not excuse, or even provide reasonable grounds for, inaction, given that the 
need for action is transparent. 
This political interest in the ontological has taken many forms in recent years, and is 
evidenced by the emergence of new neologisms and even full vocabularies that reflect its 
relationship to various social realities and intellectual currents. Some of these trends are 
more clearly aligned with the subject side of the subject/object “spectrum”13: for 
                                                 
13. I use this term with some hesitation for two reasons: first, because of the 
potential implications of the quantification of subjectivity, which has the potential to pose 
serious ethical problems in suggesting that one may be “more” or “less” human; second, 
because to place these two concepts beside each other as two composite parts of a 
dichotomy is to suggest that they are oppositional, which is to take a certain dominant 
historical narrative as the truth as we simultaneously put it into question – a kind of 
performative contradiction. 
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example, we might look to Elaine Graham’s notion of “ontological hygiene.” Ontological 
hygiene is not a phrase used to identify and correct the status quo in favour of a 
framework implemented as a radical attempt to collapse the res cogitans into the res 
extensa, nor is it even a straightforward claim that the two are entirely congruous. Rather, 
it acknowledges that there is a “symbiotic relationship between humanity and its 
artefacts, a blurring of agent and object, external and internal, organic and artificial [my 
emphasis].”14 This fact attains a political edge for Graham when she superimposes upon 
it the fact that these “fictions of imporous essences” are created and adapted15 
discursively as a form of “complicity” with the belief that agency and personhood are in 
finite supply16 – making the possibility of imbrication simultaneously a “threat of 
similarity.”17 This authoritarian attitude, which she aligns with Bruno Latour’s ideas 
around purification,18 is what bolsters conservative attitudes toward hybridity at a time 
when technological advances across the board (e.g. medical procedures, 
telecommunications) promise quality of life enhancements in a way (i.e. invasively, 
immersively) that those who hold such attitudes would consider inimical to their beliefs. 
What is at stake here is the subject, and how ontological practices wield the power to 
                                                 
14. Elaine L. Graham, Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens and 
Others in Popular Culture (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 33. 
15. The emphasis on the adaptive aspect of these “fictions” is meant to highlight 
its status as evidence of a mens rea behind the changing conceptual matter of the 
“human.” While the mutability of the term does not illustrate anything intrinsically, the 
dynamic history of the term indicates a motivation to be located.  
16. Ibid., 35. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Ibid., 33; Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 35. 
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regulate potential reconfigurations of human embodiment and thus our existential 
freedoms.  
If we tweak this formulation only slightly, however, we can see the more material angle. 
Carrying forward Edwin Hutchins’ theory of distributed cognition, disciplines such as 
cyborg anthropology re-purpose this perennial topic to scrutinise, for example, the 
interaction of technology and cerebral memory. By articulating how physical artefacts 
can be seen as vessels of knowledge, cyborg anthropology gestures toward a cognitive 
model that not only gains traction and resonance in a contemporary world increasingly 
diffused with technological integration, both at an individual and collective level, but also 
puts our own status as subjects – or, rather, the clarity of demarcations that inscribe and 
constrain such a status – into question. This is not to say that this discipline is engaged 
primarily in complicating the notion of the subject with what we might call a “pro-
material bent.” As N. Katherine Hayles rightly points out, discourse on the cyborg body 
often falls into time-honoured rhetoric that yet valorizes the mind at the expense of the 
flesh, eschewing an extension of intrinsic value to the material in favour of extending it a 
conditional acknowledgment of utility – a utility predicated upon its ability to deal in the 
currency of the cognitive. “To the extent that the posthuman constructs embodiment as 
the instantiation of thought/information,” she comments, “it continues the liberal 
tradition19 rather than disrupts it.”20 However, it also bears the seed of a perspective that 
re-casts materiality with the hue of a distinctively, traditionally subjective quality. Hayles 
herself, in her conclusion, cites Hutchins in agreement, quoting a passage where he states 
                                                 
19. Hayles uses the term “liberal tradition” to refer to the more specific idea of the 
liberal humanist subject, which emphasizes the subject as a discrete, self-possessed 
“thinker” at the expense of an understanding of the subject that is more attuned to the 
soco-political aspects of the body and its effects on self-determination. 
20. N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in 
Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 5. 
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that “[w]hat used to look like internalization [of thought and subjectivity] now appears as 
a gradual propagation of organized functional properties across a set of malleable 
media,”21 commenting that this is a “potent antidote to the view that parses virtuality as a 
division between an inert body that is left behind and a disembodied subjectivity that 
inhabits a virtual realm.”22 While radical transhumanists who conceive of the body as 
mere “meat” are not extinct (as we might see, for example, in the enthusiastic 
crosspollination of cyberpunk literature), there is a growing interest in seeing the body 
and materiality at large as integral parts of the constitution of the subject. More than just 
an enabling ground, such philosophies see this materiality as a persistent and significant 
influence on what it is to be a subject.  
While this gets us in the direction of the object, however, it admittedly stops short of 
what we discussed above in our consideration of political ontology. Cyborg anthropology 
may dabble in both the political and the ontological, but materiality appears only as a 
means to “get to” the subject – a modificative appendage. This is illustrated forcefully by 
the emphasis on bodies, the “material shells” traditionally seen to quite literally “body 
forth” consciousness, and supplementary technologies with instrumental values already 
affixed. The object qua “bare” object has little place here. This appendage, it is true, 
forms a sweeping alteration to some of our fundamental notions of the human essence, 
but the fact that it is this human essence that is at the forefront of study precludes the 
possibility of a true equivocality. We might also point out, as a methodological 
consideration, that if we are cognizant of our roles as subjects investigating objects, and 
we subscribe to the belief that we can never achieve a “view from nowhere” and that all 
knowledge is in fact situated, then – if we are touting ourselves as advocates (or, at least, 
interested parties) in the material – then we ought not err in the direction of ourselves, but 
open ourselves up more widely to the object, and do so with a level of self-reflexivity and 
                                                 
21. Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 312. 
22. Hayles, 290.  
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awareness of our inhabitation of a perspective.23 How, then, can we turn more sharply to 
the object proper? 
Although it may seem counterintuitive, one answer, I believe, lays in the direction of 
phenomenology. At first, this may simply seem like a misreading of what 
phenomenology stands for: to go back to the things themselves (as phenomenology 
famously proclaims) seems like, for our purposes, an ideal maxim, but there is much 
more below the surface than a superficial aphorism. Understood literally, such a dictate 
could be assumed to express the same sentiment that lays behind empirical enterprise. 
Empiricism relies on evidence provided through sensory input to come to conclusions 
about the world around us, and if we take the ultimate project of science to be consilience 
of knowledge, science uses empiricism to fashion stringent methodological guidelines so 
that we can be assured that such a project always contains, even if as an elusive horizon, 
the possibility of internal cohesion within self-evident boundaries by affixing it firmly to 
our access to the external world. What more could we ask for in a thoroughgoing 
examination of the object? Indeed, there is a way in which empiricism remains closer to 
the physical object than phenomenology. This is because empiricism commits to the 
object in a way that phenomenology cannot – which returns us to our maxim.  
To return to the things themselves is not exactly to turn our attention to the object. 
Rather, to do so is to respond to a call to put thought to work as a solvent against the 
                                                 
23. Donna Haraway’s denigration of the “god trick” well-encapsulates the 
sentiments behind such a critique of insensitivity to epistemological positioning, arguing 
pertinently that “rational knowledge does not pretend to disengagement: to be 
everywhere and so nowhere, to be free from interpretation, from being represented, to be 
fully self-contained or fully formalizable,” but rather “is a process of ongoing critical 
interpretation among ‘fields’ of interpreters or decoders.” See Donna Haraway, “Situated 
Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective,” Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (1988): 590. 
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lacquer of ideology that coats our experience; it is to strip away the inessential, or to get 
at the raw data offered up to our lived experience. Part of the process of accessing this 
“raw data” is to suspend judgment concerning the reality of the external world: this part 
of the phenomenological method is referred to as the phenomenological epoché, and 
involves “put[ting] out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of the 
natural attitude… parenthesiz[ing] everything which that positing encompasses with 
respect to being.”24 (The “natural attitude” here refers to the common sense 
understanding of and manner of treating the world that we adopt in our everyday lives.) 
In other words, a fundamental part of the phenomenological reduction, in obtaining direct 
access to “things,” involves – requires – putting into question the very existence of the 
objects of our knowledge. While it must be emphasized that such a position is not 
tantamount to refusing the existence of these objects, it does lend at least some credence 
to the possibility. If the object may not even exist, it is hard to conceive of it as important 
and originary. 
Bearing this in mind, how can we see phenomenology as an acceptable (never mind 
ideal) means to approach the object?  To do so, we might simply see this practice as not a 
dismissal of the importance of the objective realm, but rather an act of epistemological 
humility. The epoché exists as a central tenet of phenomenology because, in the eyes of 
its practitioners, it is a critical step in allowing the essence or eidos of the phenomenon to 
surface. One of the consequences of existing at an advanced point in intellectual history 
is simultaneously a reason for celebration and apprehension: thousands of years of 
speculation on a plethora of subjects means that said subjects have a wealth of relevant 
discursive material, making them both a fertile ground for a sublationary model of 
knowledge acquisition and a serious impediment to considering these subjects as if with 
“fresh eyes.” Materially, the object is only the object, discrete and self-contained; as soon 
as we move in the direction of material or intellectual culture, however, we come to see 
                                                 
 24. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 61. 
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matter as heavily imbued with subjective purposes, beliefs, opinions, values, etc. If we 
want to lift the weight of these subjective narratives, it is necessary to take a cue from 
Descartes and start with a tabula rasa. The suspension of belief is thus not a mark of 
disparagement, but of sensitivity to the interpretive powers of our subjective 
consciousness on a radically other object of knowledge, and accordingly, an attempt to 
minimize the influence of an intellectual environment that persistently, pervasively, but 
invisibly sediments our experience of the world. Rather than seeing this as yet another 
prioritization of the subject, we might consider it a gesture toward recognition and 
mitigation of “the violent hubris of Western philosophy, a tradition that has consistently 
failed to mind the gap between concept and reality, object and thing.”25 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the relationship of empiricism to the object is one of 
convenience. Empiricism sees the object as a kind of surface strata that has locked within 
it answers that can lend themselves to a larger fact-collecting project, in which the object 
exhausts its value; in Heideggerian terms, its interest in being is always secondary to that 
of beings. This formulation may seem confusing, since we are interested in precisely 
these beings. However, it is the being of the being outside of its pure facticity that 
concerns us. This is not to say that phenomenology has no ulterior motives of its own: it 
is, at its root, concerned with studying structures of consciousness and how phenomena 
appear to it. Nothing could be more completely interested in the human condition. 
However, it may be possible to re-deploy such a strategy of investigating the object in the 
object’s favour. By eliminating the intellectual noise that dogs other frameworks and 
focusing on our being-in-the-world, we may be more successful in allowing the object to 
present itself, basing our analysis of its status and worth on testimony that it offers. We 
may, then, find a way to satisfy our requirements of a) getting at the object proper in a 
manner that allows us to b) investigate its intrinsic value without c) failing to respect its 
quiddity or d) prioritizing our self-interest or e) submitting to our own biophilia. 
                                                 
25. Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 13. 
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Before we use phenomenology to our advantage, however, we must first arrive at an 
angle from which we can approach it. My research will consist of a number of prior steps. 
In my first chapter, I would like to look at a recent text that falls loosely into the category 
of speculative realism: Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter. My consideration of this text will 
circumscribe a number of questions about how her unique ideas about a vital matter can 
help us develop our own work, and will lead me to consider the importance of autonomic 
processes (action-oriented perception) in moving forward with Bennett’s vision. In my 
second chapter, I will attempt to mitigate the problem of these autonomic processes by 
introducing Clark and Chalmers’ extended mind theory in order to complicate the 
relationship between physical object and subjective mind. Finally, in my third and final 
chapter, I will use phenomenological description in order to push the implications of 
Clark and Chalmers’ work to their fullest extent, arguing that if matter is integral to 
memory, it is only ever because memory owes itself to matter. 
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2 Vital Materialism: The Action of Materiality and the 
Materiality of Action 
For most devotees of the Humanities with even peripheral interest in dramatic theory, 
Bertolt Brecht’s alienation effect is a familiar concept.26 For a single idea, it performs a 
lot of work: it inscribes the value of self-reflexive technique into performance; it lives out 
the political possibilities embedded in narrative acts of representation; it perforates the 
boundaries between spectator and critic. But this is not to say that the idea has a purely 
reflective appeal, or that it is a practice whose natural habitat exists somewhere in the 
vicinity of an ivory tower. As aficionados of Beau Willimon’s political drama House of 
Cards will likely attest, the dry drawl adopted by Frank Underwood as he breaks down 
the fourth wall to deliver cold and candid commentary as the plot thickens is anything but 
ineffectual intellectualist bombast.27 While his rhetoric and delivery certainly play a part 
in its efficacy, the mere act of breaking down that fourth wall strikes the audience with a 
sense of immediacy and self-awareness that transforms their occupation from voyeur to 
interlocutor, casting the narrative in a strange new light. This is not how television drama 
is “supposed” to work. In conventional formulas, traditions clearly isolate that which 
happens on-camera (the actively unfolding plot) from that which happens off-camera (the 
purely receptive audience). Breaking with these traditions thwarts audience expectations, 
and this retraction of the immersive and escapist qualities of the viewing experience 
comes in tandem with feelings of alienation or estrangement. 
Even if all the world’s a stage, it is not true in any relevant sense, for us: our current 
interests reside not in the players, but in the audience. The alienation effect works to 
                                                 
 26. Bertolt Brecht, “On Chinese Acting,” ed. Bernard Hewitt, The Tulane Drama 
Review 6, no. 1 (1961): 130-136. 
 27. David Fincher and Joel Schumacher, House of Cards: Season 1, Sony Pictures 
Entertainment, 2013. 
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highlight the artifice sustained by technical strategies in order to pave clear roads for the 
audience toward identification with and/or empathy for characters – a tactic not free of 
political implications. On the flipside, we are interested in highlighting the artifice 
sustained by discursive strategies in order to pave clear roads for the subject toward 
attitudes of otherness and primacy over objects. Achieving such a reverse alienation 
effect (a “kinship effect,” we might call it) is, perhaps unsurprisingly, difficult – the 
narrative that we are aiming to disrupt is not a fictional construction that we watch in 
one-hour stints, but our actual lives, in which we are permanently immersed. Our tactics, 
then, will need to worker harder to achieve their own political implications. We have 
already identified and briefly broached this in the context of biocentrism via biophilia, 
both in its weaker (animal, vegetable) and stronger (anthropocentrism) forms. Such bias 
is sufficiently self-evident and self-explanatory that further analysis does not seem 
necessary, although we must still account for it. But this conversation can easily be 
extended.  
As part of the overarching problem of finding a way to overcome the social obstacles to 
re-envisioning objecthood, this conversation is explicitly addressed and taken up by Jane 
Bennett’s Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Bennett’s objective is much the 
same as our own: she too has as her target the mis-en-scène of the glowing subject, 
enshrined in soul and standing against a darkened backdrop of inert, brute matter. She too 
is interested in turning away from systems and styles of thought that firmly entrench the 
subject as the primary object of study. Naturally, then, she too recognizes the 
concatenation of circumstances that plague such efforts. A number of factors come into 
play that confound both theoretical and pragmatic discussion on change that, even if 
relatively slight, is widely distributed across the domains of the social, cultural, ethical, 
metaphysical, etc. In her project, Bennett comments on how she is forced to “shift from 
the language of epistemology to that of ontology, from a focus on an elusive recalcitrance 
hovering between immanence and transcendence (the absolute) to an active, earthy, not-
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quite-human capaciousness (vibrant matter).”28 This difficulty in language and in 
scholarly province is exacerbated by a number of intuitions that we have in regards to our 
own self-identity, and in this particular case, a foundational part of our argument is the 
“oxymoronic truism that the human is not exclusively human, and that we are made up of 
its”29 – she goes so far as to consider, for example, the crook of one’s elbow as “a special 
ecosystem, a bountiful home to no fewer than six tribes of bacteria.”30 One of the primary 
obstacles that she identifies is a consanguine concern to biocentrism, inasmuch as it 
relates to involuntary, biologically-based practices: action-oriented perception, or the way 
in which the mind instinctively flattens its environment into brute matter for 
manipulation.31 We might recall the law of the instrument here (otherwise known as 
Maslow’s hammer), the familiar adage by which we are reminded that, if all one has is a 
hammer, one tends to see all problems as a nail. Action-oriented perception, as a tool that 
we use to help us engage with the world in a productive manner, thus might be seen as 
the hammer; all of our engagements with the material world then take on not only the 
prospect of being conducive to such treatment, but become imbued with a fundamental 
quality of being amenable to such treatment – it becomes expressed not only as a virtual 
possibility, but a primary element of its identity. 
What this ultimately boils down to is the tension inherent in the is-ought dichotomy. This 
is to say: regardless of pressures exerted by normative statements, factual circumstance 
and its corresponding exigencies play a dominant role in the basic act of perception. Of 
                                                 
 28.  Bennett, 3. 
 29.  Ibid., 112. 
 30. Nicholas Wade, “Bacteria Thrive In Inner Elbow; No Harm Done,” The New 
York Times, May 23, 2008. While our reconceptualization of matter differs quite 
fundamentally from Bennett’s, the similarities in the projects mean that the 
methodological concerns that she faces are transferable. 
 31. Bennett, xiv. 
20 
 
course, to argue that action-oriented perception is a mere “problem” would be absurd; our 
project is not interested in withdrawing from the instrumental interactions with the 
objective realm, but rather is interested in reconceptualising the affordances given to us 
by this objective realm, and how we ought to attribute values to this relationship. We are 
cognizant of our dependence on action-oriented perception for our survival. We simply 
agree with Bennett (as well as Bergson and Nietzsche) that it is “dangerous and 
counterproductive to live this fiction all the time,”32 and seek a means to transform this 
default attitude into one that is more sensitive to the complexities of our material milieu. 
Recognizing action-oriented perception as a kind of Maslow’s hammer – a tool that, 
while constructive, overextends its utility to detrimental effect – is the first step in 
crafting a perspective whose teleology lines up with both our needs as organisms and the 
quiddity of the object. 
There are a couple of steps that must be taken to accept such perception as a legitimate 
obstacle against a project of re-imagination. The first is quite straightforward: is action-
oriented behaviour in fact perceptual? Establishing this behaviour as not just conditioned 
through external practices makes for a much stronger argument for its intractability. In 
his paper “Action-oriented Perception,” Bence Nanay argues compellingly that it is. This 
argument requires a number of steps. First, Nanay outlines how what he terms the “Q-
ability” of an object – Q-ability being a relational property determined jointly by features 
of the object and features of the agent engaging said object (e.g. edibility, graspability, 
readability) – is a necessary corollary of being able to perform action Q with the object. 
For instance, the readability of object x (e.g. a book) requires certain features of the 
object (e.g. numerous pages that have been impressed with typographic symbols, the 
arrangement of these typographic symbols according to the rules of a certain language) as 
well as certain features of the agent (e.g. basic literacy, the perceptual faculty necessary 
to internalize these symbols), provided that external variables such as time and 
circumstance do not intervene. If these conditions are met, then the object is considered 
                                                 
 32. Ibid. 
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readable.33 He then further contends that this Q-ability is necessarily rooted in 
perception.34 This he distinguishes from the possibility that Q-ability is rooted in a non-
perceptual state that takes its input from a perceptual state, which would not at all be the 
same thing (what he calls a “non-perceptual account”): this would be to say that the Q-
ability of an object is only metaphorically perceived, and that to “perceive” in this case is 
only a manner of speaking, since the perception pertains only to the qualities of the object 
which are then cognized as congruent with characteristics of Q-ability.35  
This non-perceptual account is rife with problems. It would require, for instance, that the 
object be supported by a plethora of independent beliefs that could only theoretically 
congeal into the grounds of possibility for Q-ability. Let us return to our example of a 
book. An argument for action-oriented perception, which can be otherwise expressed as 
the claim that the Q-ability of an object is perceptual, would believe that the perceptual 
process is what is responsible for determining the Q-ability of the object. When I 
perceive the book, I (being both literate and possessing the relevant perceptual faculties) 
perceive its readability from certain qualities that I perceive – its layering of pages 
heavily adorned with typographic symbols that I recognize as participating in a system of 
signification, etc. To suggest that I instead perceive these qualities independently of any 
assessment as to their Q-ability, continuing on to an inferential or non-inferential process 
                                                 
 33. The explicit formula that Nanay uses runs as follows: object x is Q-able for 
agent A at time t in circumstances C if and only if it is not impossible for A to Q x at t in 
C (which he refines in order to negotiate several different accounts of impossibility, the 
formula ultimately becoming: an object x is Q-able for agent A at time t in circumstances 
C if and only if there is a sufficiently high number of relatively close possible worlds 
where A’s attempt to Q x at t in C succeeds). Bence Nanay, “Action-Oriented 
Perception,” European Journal of Philosophy 20, no. 3 (2010): 430-431. 
 34. Ibid., 430. 
 35. Ibid., 437. 
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that guides me toward Q-ability, is to invoke an ever-burgeoning mass of beliefs that 
would need to be verified in order to make this very same determination – that the book 
is not going to disappear into thin air, etc. Nanay, however, points out that this criticism 
is not particularly difficult to overcome: the backlog of perceptual requirements to 
consider an object Q-able in a non-perceptual account of Q-ability simply makes 
attribution of Q-ability arduous, and does not deny the object Q-ability – and, 
furthermore, we can use assumption to cut through some of that arduousness.36 The 
beauty of inductive reasoning is that it gives us a stepping stone to probable beliefs that 
we are justified in acting on, allowing us to fast-track through the realm of pure 
possibility without the likelihood of getting “tripped up.” 
However, non-perceptual accounts suffer from a more serious problem: namely, the fact 
that the way that we act in the world often puts our representation of the Q-ability of an 
object at loggerheads with our knowledge of the Q-ability of the object. Nanay uses the 
example of a beach ball: if thrown in my direction, I raise up my hands to catch it, even if 
a layer of plexiglass of which I am aware interrupts its trajectory. It is a voluntary 
movement: I have an awareness of having initiated this movement; my body responds to 
the situation according to the material conditions in which it finds itself (e.g. my arms 
will reach higher or lower depending on the arc of the ball). It cannot thus be said to be a 
reflex movement, like the striking of a medical instrument to provoke an involuntary 
physical response.37 And yet this action puts my representation of the Q-ability of the 
                                                 
 36. He summarizes this concisely when he states that “[n]ot representing the 
object as something that will disappear once I touch it does not imply representing it as 
something that will not disappear once I touch it: not representing x as F does not imply 
representing x as non-F. In other words, it is possible that we just take it for granted that 
objects we touch will not disappear without explicitly representing it as something that 
will not disappear.” Ibid., 438. 
 37. Ibid., 439. 
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object (the catchability of the beach ball, affirmed in my voluntary movement) at odds 
with my knowledge of the Q-ability of the object (I know that the ball is not catchable, 
since there is an impenetrable obstacle that stands between myself and the ball). If we 
want to continue with our example of the book, we might say that, in the event that I 
come across a text written in a language in which I am not conversant, I cannot help but 
represent the book as readable – perhaps even leaf through it – even though I 
simultaneously know that the language barrier is insurmountable. Nanay frames this as a 
kind of knockout punch to non-perceptual accounts of Q-ability. Beliefs are famously 
sensitive to beliefs, and perception is famously belief-independent.38 If I know that the 
ball is not catchable, I should not represent the ball as catchable if this representation is a 
belief, since beliefs are sensitive to beliefs. Yet I do. The explanation that Nanay offers, 
then, is that this representation of the ball as catchable can be clarified if we consider that 
Q-ability is in fact perceptual. When we perceive, we do so independently of our beliefs. 
Perceptions and beliefs may need to be reconciled internally after the act of perception, 
but the perception is never “through a glass, darkly” – ignoring external variables such as 
indeterminacy, which relate to the mechanism of perception itself, the received 
perception is divorced from the interjections of belief. In Nanay’s words, “[w]e literally 
see objects as edible or climbable.”39 
Having established that the Q-ability of an object is in fact perceptual, there is another 
question to consider: can we confirm that the Q-ability of an object is a natural attitude 
rather than a specialized form of perception? In other words, we have compiled an 
argument for why action-oriented perspectives of objects are ultimately perceptual, but 
we have not compiled an argument for the degree to which action-oriented perspectives 
contribute to our overall acts of perception. If this is, for example, a relatively specialized 
and infrequent phenomenon (perhaps “switched” on and off according to either practical 
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necessity or our temporary comportment), it should not be seriously considered as an 
obstacle to our project. In our example of the book, we demonstrate how we cannot help 
but perceive rather than, say, infer the book as readable. But to say that we cannot help 
but perceive the book as readable inasmuch as the readability of the book arises as a 
latent question posed by the object is not to say that any and all perceptions of this book 
will necessarily engage its readability. In response to this query, one might point to 
phenomenological experience to argue that the Q-ability of an object is part and parcel of 
a natural attitude that is neither specialized and infrequent nor insurmountable. Alva Nöe, 
in making a slightly different point, illustrates this idea well with the phenomenon of 
eating. When we eat, we think of ourselves as eating the foodstuff at hand (for example, a 
tomato). In terms of how we process the situation, we are never eating a part of the 
foodstuff – although, in reality, this is in fact exactly what we are doing (e.g. we are only 
ever consuming pieces of the tomato, even though we think of ourselves as “eating the 
tomato”). Why? Because this phenomenon of eating appears to us as part of a larger, 
purposive action – much in the same way that, with our book, we may only be 
comprehending one word at a time, but we would never reply earnestly to an inquiry 
about our task that we are “reading a word,” but would instead respond that we are 
“reading a book,” since this is the larger, purposive action with which we are engaged. In 
arguing otherwise, you would miss the point: “[y]ou would misdescribe the… experience 
of a solid, voluminous item of fruit, the tomato, if you were to describe it as an 
experience as a bit of surface.”40 Nöe’s point is that if we “take our experience at face 
value,” it can reveal itself in a more objective way (i.e. eating a bit of tomato), but this is 
not phenomenologically true of the experience that we described (i.e. eating the 
tomato).41 It may be correct, and we can derive this explanation through the 
superimposition of a certain attitude: it is, therefore, not insurmountable. But the 
strangeness of thinking this way gestures toward a more natural, instrumental attitude. 
                                                 
40. Alva Nöe, Action in Perception (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 76. 
41. Ibid.  
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What has this analysis contributed to our understanding of the subject’s relationship with 
the object? Its primary function was to emphasize what we have already, in the course of 
developing the problem driving this investigation, discovered: discourse on materiality 
can be and is influenced below the conscious level, and changing this discourse is thus 
not a straightforward problem whose solution consists of recognition and thus resolution. 
It is reassuring to frame ethical problems much like mathematical equations: if we have 
the equation (the problem), and we can obtain the value of x (the ethical framework), then 
we can simply apply the value of x (the ethical framework) to the equation (the problem) 
and all tension will dissolve in a satisfying, effervescent process that reveals a simplified 
answer. In what comes across as a rather endearingly world-weary tone, James Franklin – 
in a paper that carefully considers the parallels and lack thereof between mathematics and 
ethics – deliberates wistfully on the idea of “morals [that] were like the laws of number 
and logic: eternal truths that absolutely constrain all possible behaviours. Then, the 
problems of ethics would be settled on a calm and rational basis, once and for all. Tribal 
differences would vanish, behaviour would conform naturally to ethical norms, and 
evildoing would become as rare as arithmetical errors.”42 As the sweeping nature of his 
ideals suggest, however, ethics is a good deal more complicated than this (pragmatically 
speaking).  
This brings us, then, to our final step in recognizing action-oriented perception as a 
legitimate obstacle. We might frame the motivating question thus: what repercussions 
does action-oriented perception have for our project? Action-oriented perception gestures 
to another way in which our attitudes toward materiality are, at least in part, an outgrowth 
of our biological apparatuses and the way in which they have evolved to operate. Our 
deliberate and inventive bond with our environment is one of the most distinguishing 
characteristics of Homo sapiens sapiens, even if the distance between human and non-
human animal behaviour shrinks each new day with the growing body of research on the 
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topic. On the one hand, this makes it very difficult to “unstir the cream from the coffee – 
to disentangle the cultural from the natural.”43 This is perfectly congenial to the project at 
hand. However, it also severely complicates our attempts to achieve a sort of ekstatis 
through which we may problematize what Rancière calls the “partition of the sensible.”44 
In short, one is right to doubt the legitimacy of an  is-ought fallacy, but one simply cannot 
epistemologically doubt the factual veracity of the is and its constraining force on how 
we perceive and thus understand the world. 
Bennett’s answer to this paradox, while admittedly not devoid of qualifications, is at least 
explicit: revise (or, perhaps, append a revision to) our notions of agency. Vibrant Matter 
acts as part manifesto, part historiography; in it, she addresses how a number of canonical 
and/or influential thinkers have developed accounts of materiality that, to varying degrees 
and with varying levels of transparency and intention, constructed concepts that imparted 
something roughly equivalent to agency to the object. Of course, since we are sensitive to 
the power of language in producing effects, we must try our best to avoid subject-
centered vocabularies that might undermine our efforts as we deploy them.45 We still run 
                                                 
 43. Bennett, 116. 
 44. Rancière, 19-20. 
45. Bennett also reflects on the differences between the words “object” and 
“thing,” which she sees as being involved to different degrees in subject-centered thought 
(i.e. “object” having a subjective cast). My choice to employ the word “object” is for 
several reasons. First, the words that Bennett borrows from Latour (“actant,” “operator”) 
are more causally-oriented than seems appropriate given the direction of this project, 
which is ultimately less concerned with issues strictly relating to physical causation per 
se. Second, the word “object” implies a discrete unit, thus its use seems intuitive in 
proceeding with a project that aims to be livable, and thus invokes everyday items as 
examples. Given that I am not wholly committed to all of Bennett’s positions, I consider 
this terminological decision to be a reasonable choice. 
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the risk of performative contradiction, if weak. Furthermore, the philosophical lineage of 
the term “agency” is so exhaustively worked-over that it is difficult to envision it as 
unsaturated by strictly cerebral notions of purposiveness and intention, while Bennett 
finds it “both possible and desirable to experiment with the idea of an impersonal agency 
integral to materiality as such, a vitality distinct from human or divine purposiveness.”46 
Having a distinction set up thus not only exhibits care for intellectual integrity, but allows 
Bennett to give the object the chance for unique properties (which will allow her to more 
easily move between the epistemological and ontological – a concern that we voiced 
earlier). For this reason, Bennett refers to Bruno Latour’s work for a vernacular more 
complementary to her sensibilities, appropriating especially the concept of the “actant.”  
Bennett sees and respects the “negative power” of objects – their “refus[al] to dissolve 
completely into the milieu of human knowledge.”47 What “actant” signifies, however, is 
the object’s simultaneous ability to engender effects: it hinges on the argument that the 
halcyon existence of the object does not preclude its ability to assert itself in the world. It 
is simply a source of action that “implies no special motivation of human individual 
actors, nor of humans in general.”48 This term she uses in conjunction with “operator,” a 
word to designate one of the more specialized ways in which we use the word “agent”: as 
a catalyst, something that becomes a “decisive force” in the occurrence of an event based 
on the fortuity of it being in “the right place at the right time.”49 What these additions to 
our vocabulary afford us is a manner of speaking that is more conducive to perceiving 
and thus cognizing objects as something more than we think of them in our everyday 
lives. Without losing their sense of ineffability, they also “shimmer and spark” in a new 
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light – a light that permits them to appear as “vivid entities not entirely reducible to the 
contexts in which (human) subjects set them, never entirely exhausted by their 
semiotics.”50  They achieve “thing-power”: “the curious ability of inanimate things to 
animate, to act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle,”51 and in so doing, “exceed their 
status as objects and to manifest traces of independence or aliveness… a perhaps small 
but irreducible degree of independence from the words, images, and feelings they 
provoke in us [my emphasis].”52 It is this attitude that encapsulates the spirit of what 
Bennett coins vital materialism – a materialism that, without slipping into the hokum of 
intellectual tassology, acknowledges that je ne sais quoi that permeates all taxonomies in 
its “differential distribut[ion] across a wider range of ontological types.”53  
Absent of concrete explanation (especially pertinent given the subject at hand), this 
formulation runs the risk of sounding more like empty rhetoric than substantiated 
arguments. But Bennett is careful to always suffuse her theoretical exegesis with applied 
examples. True, these examples at times toe the line between rationalism and quasi-
mysticism. Perhaps the clearest instance of such quasi-mysticism crops up in her 
recounting of an experience at a storm drain on Cold Spring Lane, where she articulates 
her personal account of a lived experience of the phenomenon of thing-power (which I 
will quote, given its narrative structure, at length): 
On a sunny Tuesday afternoon on 4 June in the grate over the storm drain to the 
Chesapeake Bay in front of Sam’s Bagels on Cold Spring Lane in Baltimore, 
there was: 
                                                 
 50. Ibid., 5. 
 51. Ibid., 6.  
 52. Ibid., xvi.   
 53. Ibid., 9. 
29 
 
one large men’s black plastic work glove 
one dense mat of oak pollen 
one unblemished dead rat 
one white plastic bottle cap 
one smooth stick of wood 
Glove, pollen, rat, cap, stick. As I encountered these items, they shimmied back 
and forth between debris and thing – between, on the one hand, stuff to ignore, 
except insofar as it betokened human activity (the workman’s efforts, the litterer’s 
toss, the rat-poisoner’s success), and, on the other hand, stuff that commanded 
attention in its own right, as existents in excess of their association with human 
meanings, habits, or projects. In the second moment, stuff exhibited its thing-
power: it issues a call, even if I did not quite understand what it was saying. At 
the very least, it provoked affects in me: I was repelled by the dead (or was it 
merely sleeping?) rat and dismayed by the litter, but I also felt something else: a 
nameless awareness of the impossible singularity of that rat, that configuration of 
pollen, that otherwise utterly banal, mass-produced plastic water-bottle cap. … I 
achieved, for a moment, what Thoreau had made his life’s goal: to be able, as 
Thomas Dumm puts it, “to be surprised by what we see.”54 
There is no questioning the fact that this description, which she uses early in the work to 
introduce the reader to the sentiment behind her work, is a far cry from traditional 
argumentative writing – whether this be in her home discipline of political science or in a 
philosophical text. Its diction is pointedly evocative, even poignant: objects “shimmy,” 
“provoke,” and “call,” and her descriptive cataloguing of the material components of this 
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assemblage of items and its marked emphasis of the singularity of each constituent part 
gives it a feeling comparable to a still life painting, whose careful, exclusive attentiveness 
to the mundane makes every object (metaphorically, but at times literally) glow. Its 
function seems decidedly aesthetic. While this does fall under the general category of 
axiology, the treatment of values here is distinctly different than that of ethics. The 
ultimate effect is the impression of objects as something beautiful, ineffable, and 
impregnated with a mysterious agency: it is not hard to see why the accusation of 
mysticism might arise.55 
In response to this accusation, however, I feel that there are two particularly important 
points to be made. The first is: unconventional projects sometimes require 
unconventional means. As is generally a good rule of thumb, it is always best to choose a 
tool well-suited to the job at hand, and given that Bennett’s project falls somewhat 
outside of the realm of normalcy, it makes sense that her strategy should reflect that. This 
is a conscious decision on her part, in alignment with her belief that “[w]hat seems to be 
needed is a certain willingness to appear naïve or foolish” in order to “describe without 
thereby erasing the independence of things.”56 Bennett is certainly not the first scholar 
who, disenchanted with the strictures placed (explicitly or normatively) on thought by a 
scientific mode of discourse, has resorted to what might be seen as eccentricity (both in 
the sense informed by common parlance [strangeness] and the sense informed by 
etymology [being ekkentros, or out of center]). In her own treatise on thingness, Freya 
Mathews, for example, speaks out about her experiences wherein “[f]rom the viewpoint 
of Western thought in general, the idea of a world alive with meanings of its own 
appeared atavistic, a throwback to a primitive anthropomorphic realism that had been 
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superseded and invalidated both by scientific culture and by the epistemological insights 
of modern philosophy.”57 This critical reception of her scholarly interests, however, does 
not detain her, and her work skirts this problem by at times adopting a more aesthetic 
approach to articulating its positions. It sets up new (or, perhaps more accurately, merely 
customized) terms for new intellectual territory, “bring[ing] together the philosophical 
and poetic influences personified in Schopenhauer and Morris respectively, to show how 
it is possible rationally to transcend the metaphysical presuppositions of modern 
civilization and arrive at the threshold of a new, poetic, relation to the world.”58 It is with 
this end goal of a more poetic sensibility that Mathews can speak of, for example, how it 
was “a confluence of love and metaphysics [that] broke the surface of experience in a 
particularly pure fount of enchantment in that interlude in the bluebell cottage with 
Schopenhauer.”59 
But, to move on to our second point, neither Bennett nor Mathews take this challenge as 
antagonistic, and their methods for overcoming their pragmatic challenges take advantage 
of the intellectual goods offered by the very bodies of knowledge that pose these 
challenges. Mathews contends quite strongly that  
[t]he epistemological claims of science cannot be dismissed with an airy, post-
Enlightenment wave of the hand. Every time we step onto an airplane or type our 
thoughts into a word processor, speak on the phone or shop in a supermarket, we 
bear witness to our tacit faith in the terms of the modern episteme. The chic 
epistemological relativism of postmodern culture is belied by these acts. Any new 
metaphysical orientation to which we aspire must, in the end, be consistent with 
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the evidence of science and with the requirements of reason, even if it in turn 
throws doubt on the ethics of prevailing forms of scientific rationalism and 
suggests new modalities of inquiry [my emphasis].60 
We see this two-pronged approach as a constant, considered back-and-forth in Bennett’s 
text. Her interest in Deleuzian assemblages, for example, is grounded in a scientific 
interest in topics such as dietary impacts on moods and cognitive dispositions. Yes, the 
pervasiveness of the concept of assemblages in her work points to the fact that the idea 
alone must hold some amount of intellectual grip for her. But the notion of ad hoc 
collections of forces – fluctuating but functioning, coming together and breaking apart 
through processes of de- and re-territorialization61 – is never invoked as idle talk; it is 
always put to work in the service of explaining objective phenomena. In the case of food, 
for example, the concept of the assemblage highlights how “a small change in eater-eaten 
complex may issue in a significant disruption of its pattern or function,” and “[t]he 
assemblage in which persons and fats are participants is perhaps better figured as a 
nonlinear system.”62 Food, as an actant contributing to a larger assemblage, embodies her 
notion of vital materialism in its ability to produce surprising and difficult-to-
circumscribe effects, but this does not preclude its simultaneous analysis as part of a 
process that can be scientifically rationalized. Or, we might instead turn to her 
explanation of the 2003 blackout, in which approximately 50 million people were 
affected by the shutting down of over 100 power plants. Bennett is intrigued by 
descriptions of the event that characterize it as a kind of sublime and animate act 
performed by a vast network of both material and immaterial forces, acting in unison: she 
quotes the International Herald Tribune’s anthropomorphic description of the affair, in 
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which “the grid’s heart fluttered… complicated beyond all understanding, even by 
experts – [the grid] lives and occasionally dies by its own mysterious rules.”63 Yet, at the 
same time, this account is heavily informed by technical explications on the transmission 
of active and reactive power, in addition to maintenance and operation procedures, 
equipment limitations, infrastructure exploitation, regulatory standards, consumer 
demand, etc. This considerate treatment is not the work of someone who denigrates 
causal explanation in favour of mysticism.  
If we can accept Bennett’s unorthodox strategy and respect her underlying appreciation 
of the contributions of more straightforwardly scientific attitude, what, then, are we left 
with? To recapitulate: our objective is to find a new way of speaking about materiality 
that might – akin to postmodern theatrical devices – alienate ourselves from intuitive 
attitudes. Our inheritance as human beings (or, arguably, as organic matter) is a kind of 
perception that is fundamentally attuned to the actions that our bodies, as our means of 
engaging the world, can enact through our interaction with it. The solution, for Bennett, is 
to revisit this notion of agency, “turn[ing] the figures of ‘life’ and ‘matter’ around and 
around, worrying them until they start to seem strange, in something like the way a 
common word when repeated can become a foreign, nonsense sound.”64 Our ideal is 
somewhat akin to a selective aphasia; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his discussion of the 
aphasiac patient, uses a very similar description to describe his subject, for whom the 
word “is no longer useful… it says nothing to him, it is bizarre and absurd, just as names 
are for us when we have repeated them for too long.”65 But this objective, if explicit, is 
still vague. It is one thing to, by swapping or altering theoretical lenses, attempt to craft 
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an academic argument for why we ought to do something differently and thus better. It is 
quite another to extend this academic argument into an inevitably livable precept for the 
greater public. In addition to a manifesto and a general strategy, we need realizable goals 
and steps to achieve them. Shy of this, no amount of theorizing will be able to offer 
ethico-political traction.  
Unfortunately, this is where Bennett’s account struggles to deliver. It is its evanescence – 
its quality of being “too close and too fugitive, as much wind as thing, impetus as entity” 
– that challenges the task at hand, and thus to which we must now turn our attention.66 
Bennett herself realizes the difficulty of what she is asking, and offers a number of 
suggestions, lest her treatise be taken as a meritorious idea that (to borrow from Hume’s 
classic skeptical critique) “can so little serve to any serious purpose.”67 Each of these 
suggestions, however, comes with its unique ethico-political problems in tow. We might 
look into the possibility of elision: more specifically, the modification of discourse on 
human subjectivity and interiority so as to suspend or radically reduce its uptake.68 We 
might frame this as a kind of recognition of the power of aletheia: the unconcealment (a-
letheia) that simultaneously conditions the possibility of concealment, in this case the 
light that – being cast upon the subject – condemns the object to the realm of shadow. 
However, if we (as Bennett does) see agency as existing as a kind of spectrum between 
subjects and objects with different types of responsibility that accord to different degrees 
of agency, we can recognize that there are unique ethical obligations for the subject. To 
suspend discourse on those qualities of the subject that grant it these unique obligations 
seems like a recipe for disaster. We are, after all, only very recently beginning to make 
reparations for many massive oversights, and have yet to significantly acknowledge many 
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that still exist. Alternately, we might look into the possibility of anthropomorphization. 
While this strategy has the virtue of coming quite naturally to us, it seems unlikely that an 
act of self-aggrandization will do much to foster humility toward our ontological place in 
the world and our epistemological capacities, never mind inflate our notions of thing-
power. This is in addition to the risks that we would face regarding superstition, 
divinization, and romanticism, which Bennett is right to address as not inconsequential.69 
What vital materialism ultimately fails to do, to come back full circle, is to provide us 
with a mechanism whereby we can (without a prohibitive ethical penalty) imagine that 
there is not some gulf between what Bennett terms the “its” and the “mes” – something 
that we can ultimately trace back to our own biocentrism (including but not limited to our 
anthropocentrism). Bennett identifies correctly the difficulties of action-oriented 
perception, and can overcome the problems of navigating language and scholarly territory 
through her use of Latour, but cannot quite put into flight a practice that would mitigate 
its effect on our understanding of object without coming at too high of a cost. We have 
very little to fight with in our uphill battle against action-oriented perception and our own 
natural conceit as a species (and as organic beings). As a consequence, the best the 
would-be vital materialist can do is try – exhaustively, constantly, and with little but the 
force of will to aid them and against the invisible powers of cultural beliefs – is to 
cultivate a sensitivity to things so that, in time, this form of self-aware reflection might 
come to be habitual. But is there not some easier way to persist with our endeavour? 
Must we resort to archaic thought-stopping techniques, or is there some other means to 
re-orient ourselves toward the world that does not require a concerted effort at the storm 
drain on Cold Spring Lane? 
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3 The “Hegemony of Skin and Skull”70 
When I was about three years old, I fell off of a Little Tikes Playcenter and broke two 
bones in my arm. Accompanying this first demonstration of my truly regrettable lack of 
refinement in motor skills was my very first memory of pain. Staring up at the sky with 
the white clouds drifting lazily by – it was a beautiful summer day, despite some 
scattered sun showers which nearly proved to be my demise – my first impression was of 
a vague and unarticulated sense of indignation at the massive discrepancy between this 
glorious, cornflower blue sky and my sudden and terrible misfortune. Very shortly 
thereafter, there was the hysteria of pain. I was inconsolable. One hospital trip and a very 
large cast later, I was given Gruffy: a stuffed goat with a tightly-curled bounty of hair and 
stretchy leather horns that were perfect to chew. From that night until a night far off in 
the future, when I deemed the stuffed animal too “childish,” Gruffy accompanied me to 
bed, where I would hold him close and remember the way that my  generally imperious 
mother had rushed frantically to my side as I stared uncomprehendingly at that unfairly 
blue sky. He was a precious comfort to me. 
Thinking back to Gruffy, I have a strong sense of his ineffable importance. He seems to 
signify something more than the scraps of cotton batting and synthetic hair that make up 
his physical form. Yet I struggle to think of him as being in any way agentic. Following 
Bennett’s lead, I can try to think of him as an actant: something that generates effects. I 
can certainly localize a number of phenomena that link up directly to my experience of 
him: my relationship with Gruffy, sustained for decades at this point, naturally evokes a 
wide swathe of affective responses, which in turn can be traced to memories of his 
presence throughout my childhood (the security implied by my mother’s concern, for 
instance). But this response does not seem quite appropriate in terms of Bennett’s ideals, 
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either. The discarded bottle cap at Cold Spring Lane did not need to borrow its vitality 
from, say, the lips of a thirsty marathon-runner who, in the desperation of the final 
stretch, carelessly flung her waste to the ground. For Bennett, there is an intrinsic vitality 
to which she attributes a large measure of value. If we seek this value, we need to look 
for it in precisely those qualities that I first framed as the most base form of his 
significance: his cotton batting and synthetic hair. More than this: it must be his cotton 
batting qua material substance, his synthetic hair qua material substance that informs our 
search. We are not doing Gruffy justice if, for example, we consider him only as he 
“betoken[s] human activity” (the product of labour, the embodiment of technological 
advances, etc.).71 We must, like studious ethologists, observe under natural conditions 
and with an open comportment in the hopes that, like a previously-unobserved trait in an 
animal species, vibrant matter will issue a declaration to the patient observer. 
For some – those amenable to the re-enchantment of the world, for instance, or those 
attuned to poetic observation – this task is not an impossibility. For others, such an 
undertaking would be as difficult as it was absurd. Furthermore, we must note that one – 
alas – cannot remain a poet all the day long, and thoughts of Gruffy as, say, an element of 
our material environment that exerts an influence on mental states (and thus behavior) 
must soon be subsumed by his classification as clutter, his utility as a comfort-device, etc. 
If we were to construct an economy of attention, we might say that the cost of such an 
attitude (measured in the currency of time) is too high for a payoff that is too low: an 
evanescent appreciation.  
It seems that we must return, at least temporarily, to the drawing board. While the spirit 
of Bennett’s text is in line with our own, we need to find a perspective that has both 
intellectual and pragmatic traction, and while we have not come across any reason to cast 
doubt on the ontological and epistemological arguments embedded in Bennett’s vital 
materialism, we also have not found a way to transform them into livable principles. In 
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order to rectify this omission, I would like to propose that the extended mind theory 
provides a starting point to engaging, supplementing, and deploying Bennett’s ideas 
without compromising their integrity. 
What is the extended mind theory, and how can it offer us these riches? As an argument 
originating from a desire to expand our notions of cognitive processes, it is a fair 
assessment to say that extended mind theory is for us a strange bedfellow. However, if 
we turn to Andy Clark and David Chalmers’ seminal paper on the topic, “The Extended 
Mind,” we might break open a discussion on how we get from point A (the central, even 
defining, thesis of extended mind theory) to point B (our current practical challenges) 
with a single quotation. This excerpt from Clark and Chalmers’ paper is (quite agreeably 
for us) pointedly prescriptive: “epistemic action,” they suggest, “demands spread of 
epistemic credit.”72 This comment could use some unassembling, but comes ready-made 
with all of the components required for our current objective. In using the term 
“epistemic action,” Clark and Chalmers are referring to an action taken in the world that 
serves a specific type of useful purpose. Distinguished from pragmatic action, which is 
an action taken to enact a physical change that is useful for its own sake (they use the 
example of filling in a hole in a leaky dam), epistemic action enacts this physical change 
for the express purpose of assisting with cognitive processes (we might think of 
spraypainting a symbol on this dam to mark it for – and thus remember it in the context 
of – later repairs).73 “Epistemic credit” is more straightforward, simply gesturing toward 
the general maxim to “give credit where credit is due.” In other words, the motivation 
that drives Clark and Chalmers’ paper is the belief that the work that x does in 
contributing to our epistemic faculties or capabilities should be reflected in its 
appreciation as something having epistemic worth.  
                                                 
72. Clark and Chalmers, 8. 
73. Ibid.  
39 
 
The road from here is slightly clearer. What sort of things, then, can be seen as doing 
epistemic work? According to Clark and Chalmers, the answer to this question needs to 
account for the way in which cognitive processes can operate through one’s physical 
environment in a manner that is analogous to the way that cognitive processes occur 
internally, creating a “coupled system” that can be understood as a stand-alone cognitive 
system. Furthermore, it should then consider the degree to which these cognitive 
processes can have a relationship with the mind. If we consider these issues thoroughly, 
they argue, we will find that reasons for distinguishing between wholly internal cognitive 
processing and processing that relies on external objects are only superficial,74 as are the 
reasons for distinguishing between certain belief states that arise as a result of these 
corresponding forms of cognitive processing.75 As a consequence, then, we ought to 
consider the mind to be, in a sense, “extended”: the demarcations of skin and skull as the 
enclosure in which the mind resides no longer seem supportable.76 As Clark and 
Chalmers put it, “[c]ognitive processes ain’t [all] in the head,”77 and (slightly stronger) 
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“the mind extends into the world.”78 Ultimately, these arguments can be merged to 
explain what they call “active externalism,” their position which argues for the active role 
of the external environment in inner (i.e. mental) processes. This is not just a causal 
thesis, but a constitutive one: the world does not merely impinge upon the mind’s 
processes, but is part of the mind’s processes.79 
These positions are most clearly illustrated with the use of examples, which – in virtue of 
the broad nature of the thesis – are ample. Take, for instance, a map. A map is a visual 
representation of a space that expresses a certain kind (or kinds) of information about that 
space; often, the most pertinent information is the relationship between isolatable parts of 
this space (i.e. the road map, which indicates how to get from x to y via transportation 
routes, or the political map, which highlights boundaries and major cities), but it can also 
pertain to other physical properties like the terrain (i.e. the physical map) or natural 
resources (i.e. the economic map). For each of these types of map, I could be a specialist 
with all of the requisite knowledge to complete a task at hand without consulting the 
relevant information contained within the map. If I was, for example, a truck driver, I 
may have an excellent knowledge of the relationship between locations (i.e. the 
information disclosed by a road map or political map); if I was a physical geographer, I 
may have accumulated extensive knowledge of the terrain of a region (i.e. the 
information disclosed by a physical map); if I was an expert in environmental resource 
management, I may be aware of the natural resources of a particular region (i.e. the 
information disclosed by an economic map).  
Now, if in each of these situations, I have forgotten the pertinent map at home, I might 
simply close my eyes and recall the information through memory (situation 1). The truck 
driver may close his eyes and picture the winding route he takes to destination x in order 
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to recall the relative position of destination y; the physical geographer may close his eyes 
and cobble together some geographical features of the region, patching them together in 
order to assess the probable highest point of elevation in the city from which to take a 
photograph; the environmental resource management specialist may think back to the raw 
exports of a region to determine the nature of the local job market. In this case, we can 
consider the cognitive act entirely internal. Alternately, it might be the case that the map 
is in the glove compartment in front of me. I could simply use recall, as in the previous 
example, but for each specialist, it is quicker and more reliable to defer to the map (which 
gives me instantaneous and precise data on the routes between locations, the local terrain, 
and regional resources).80 The reasonable outcome here is that I utilize the (external) map 
to solve the (internally-sourced) cognitive puzzle (situation 2). Finally, to end on a 
speculative note (as Clark and Chalmers themselves do), we can imagine a situation in 
which I (again) can use recall, but this same map – through the intervention of some kind 
of assistive technology (e.g. a neural implant) – is fully accessible through the brain itself 
and only the brain itself (perhaps through a cognitive enhancement device that allows me 
to have a true photographic memory). Here, I should again consult the map, yet this 
internal process seems somehow in a liminal space between internality and externality 
(situation 3). It can hardly be said that I am engaging my environment in order to come to 
an answer: I could complete this entire process with all of my senses extinguished 
(assuming that, being internal, the map’s representation is extra-sensory). Yet this mental 
map seems less straightforwardly internal. How do we tackle the question of how each of 
these situations significantly differ from each other, in terms of internality and 
externality? 
                                                 
80. Clark and Chalmers pause on the advantages of such a deferral, since it 
fashions yet another link between the mind and the environment, given that the removal 
of an environmental aid would here be akin to removing a part of the brain in terms of a 
decrease in competence. See Clark and Chalmers, 9. 
42 
 
For Clark and Chalmers, the answer is straightforward: there is no significant difference. 
If we continue labelling these situations 1, 2, and 3 respectively, then we might say: 
if 1 = internal, and 
3 = 1, then 
3 = internal, and 
if 2 = 3, then 
2 = internal 
Or, conversely: 
if 2 = external, and 
3 = 2, then 
3 = external, and 
if 1 = 3, then 
1 = external 
Clearly, something is amiss here. Accessing an external map (2) does not seem internal, 
nor does accessing internal memories (1) seem external. So our problems seem to be 
rooted in the following elements of each formulation: 
if 1 = internal (), and  
3 = 1 (), then 
3 = internal (), and 
if 2 = 3, then 
2 = internal 
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Or: 
if 2 = external (), and 
3 = 2 (), then 
3 = external (), and 
if 1 = 3, then 
1 = external 
The problem, we can see, stems from 3, which has parallels with both 1 and 2. Starting 
with the first formulation: 1 (accessing internal memories) is internal, and appears to not 
be significantly different from 3 (accessing the map through neural implant) – after all, it 
is all inside the head. 2 (accessing an external map) also appears to not be significantly 
different from 3 (accessing the map through neural implant) – after all, both situations 
involve consulting a map. As a consequence, 2 (accessing an external map) appears to not 
be significantly different than 1 (accessing internal memories) – which is internal. We 
can run through this again with our second formulation: 2 (accessing an external map) is 
external, and appears to not be significantly different than 3 (accessing the map through 
neural implant) – after all, both situations involve consulting a map. 1 (accessing internal 
memories) also appears to not be significantly different from 3 (accessing the map 
through a neural implant) – after all, it is all inside the head. As a consequence, 1 
(accessing internal memories) appears to not be significantly different than 2 (accessing 
an external map) – which is external. In short, it appears that what must be done to 
resolve this paradox is to decide whether or not 3 is fundamentally external or internal – 
but the only way to do so is to draw a firm conclusion on whether accessing an internal 
map through neural implant is most like accessing internal memories or accessing an 
external map, which would require the answer to the significance between the 
internal/external demarcations. Since that is in fact the question under examination, a 
failure to provide this answer without recourse to the internal/external distinction itself is 
to beg the question. Unable to find a convincing answer, Clark and Chalmers thus decree 
that the distinction between purely internal cognitive processes and coupled systems 
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(with both internal and external elements) are false: “[a]ll  the components in the system 
play an active causal role, and they jointly govern behavior in the same sort of way that 
cognition usually does”; for this reason, “this sort of coupled process counts equally well 
as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head.”81 
Clark and Chalmers move forward by arguing that this collapsing of internality and 
externality in cognitive processing has wider repercussions than just changes to 
explanatory methods in cognitive theory. If we take a step further, we can see that belief 
states that arise as a result of active externalism suggest that not just cognitive processing, 
but mental states can be extended outward. If we return to our map example, we might 
explain this fairly easily. In consulting my map, I am a testament to the claim that 
cognitive processing can take place as part of a coupled system, and that this cognitive 
processing takes place outside the arbitrary boundary of my head. If we look beyond 
process at outcomes, however, the end result of this consultation is a belief: this is no 
longer a matter of cognitive processing, but of a mental state. After consulting my map, I 
believe that I can take Water Street to get to the Planet Bakery; I believe that my best 
vantage point for a photograph is at Tower Hill, part of the local drumlin field; I believe 
that the economy is dominated by industry rather than natural resource exportation. My 
belief is thus bound up with this external item, just as belief can be bound up with 
internal memory. While it may seem counterintuitive to say that a belief can be located in 
a material thing, we can again point to a lack of fundamental difference between a 
commonsense approach (e.g. that cognitive processes are internal, or that beliefs are held 
only by subjects) and an extended approach (e.g. that cognitive processes can be 
constituted externally, or that beliefs can be embodied by objects).  
In the event that I access internal memories (situation 1), the distance between my desire 
to have knowledge and the actual possession of knowledge is always mediated by the 
process of recall, and I find my belief in my memories. If I access a map (situation 2), 
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there is also a distance between my desire to have knowledge and the actual possession of 
knowledge: this distance is mediated by the process of consultation, and I find my belief 
in the map. The only difference is this internal/external distinction, which we previously 
assessed as being insignificant.82 Therefore, if we say that, in situation 1, I have a belief 
from the outset that I can take Water Street, I ought to take my photograph from Tower 
Hill, or that the local job market is industry-based, we also ought to say the same of 
situation 2. Clark and Chalmers point out that to require one to say that one consulted the 
map and then had a belief would be on par with requiring one to say that one consulted 
their memory and then had a belief, which they describe as “one step too many… 
pointlessly complex.”83 We use a form of shorthand and say that one has a belief even 
before consulting memory because we recognize that there are such things as non-
occurrent beliefs – beliefs that are held despite not being consciously deliberated at the 
present moment.84 Unless we restrict beliefs to those that are being actively entertained, it 
makes sense to say that one has a belief that is located in an object. 
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that we remember. See Menary, 10. 
83. Clark and Chalmers, 13.  
84. Ibid., 12. 
46 
 
If we accept the extended mind theory, what tools can it give us to help reorient modes of 
thought around matter? Clark and Chalmers’ final section of the text, “Beyond the Outer 
Limits,” summarizes this best in a short question of their own: “What, finally, of the self? 
Does the extended mind imply an extended self? It seems so. Most of us already accept 
that the self outstrips the boundaries of consciousness; my dispositional beliefs, for 
example, constitute in some deep sense part of who I am. If so, then these boundaries 
may also fall beyond the skin [my emphasis].”85 It is this idea of the self outstripping the 
boundaries of consciousness that most appeals to us. Bennett’s project has confronted us 
with a number of difficulties that have so far been beyond our powers to rectify: 
anthropocentrism and action-oriented perception and their effects on our ability to 
cultivate an appropriate attitude toward matter are the primary obstacles. Her response – 
to either mute the subject or personify the object – comes at too high of an ethico-
political price. Using Clark and Chalmers’ account of the extended mind, however, we 
may be able to find a loophole. If we think of our material milieu as memory, can we not 
have an easier time cultivating such an attitude? If so, are there any concessions that we 
might need to make to our objectives in order to attain a workable approach? 
Several things need to be said off the bat. First, what Clark and Chalmers argue is not that 
the world exists merely as a kind of congealed memory. To get from active externalism to 
a memory-oriented account of matter will require a certain amount of theoretical 
lilypadding, Their own claims are much more measured: that cognition and limited 
aspects of the mind might be said to exist in the exterior world. There are two significant 
ways in which their arguments in fact cause some amount of friction with our own 
tentative framework. First, while the attention that Clark and Chalmers draw to the 
difference between cognition and the mind is done with the intention of ultimately 
constructing their argument in steps – first laying the groundwork with extended 
cognition, then building on this groundwork to establish extended mind – these steps are 
tentative and partial, and they leave many of the implications unaddressed. Before 
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arguing that mind can inhere within objects, for example, they list in passing several 
different aspects of the mind that are not covered in cognition: beliefs, but also 
experiences, desires, and emotions.86 Their argument, however, only concerns belief. 
More than this, it only concerns some beliefs, or rather beliefs that have been arrived at in 
a certain manner: beliefs arising from external features that “drive” cognitive processing 
in a particular way.87 This account, while no doubt an effort to create a significant shift in 
thinking, remains heavily qualified, and we have no particular interest in belief per se – 
only per accidens, as it pertains to memory (which occurs at the crossroads of experience 
and belief). Memory itself never arises specifically in their work. 
Secondly, and arguably more importantly, Clark and Chalmers’ account is irremediably 
immersed in the subjective perspective. One would be perfectly correct in pointing out 
that their position ascribes value to the external environment in virtue of its role in 
cognition and belief states, but this value is always funneled through the subject in a way 
that detracts from its utility for our project. To say that it is self-interested is not an 
insurmountable problem: we have recognized that a view from nowhere is impossible, 
and that having “human interest” does not in principle preclude a genuine, good faith 
effort to do service to the materiality under discussion. But the methodology that Clark 
and Chalmers employ is a unidirectional extension of human operations and states to 
non-human materials. In response to criticisms of their theory, they have gone so far as to 
say that reference to an object’s cognitive quality is nothing more than “stylistic 
infelicity,” and that to see an object as a “self-contained locus of thinking” is an 
“absurdity.”88 Such a methodology and concomitant commitments cannot help but to 
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undermine any attempt to establish a unique quiddity for the object: cognition and belief 
states are merely “borrowed” attributes. If the argument was expanded to, for instance, 
illustrate that something intrinsic to the external environment played an inevitable role in 
human cognition and belief states, this would be quite different: we would be forced to 
acknowledge this environment as a ground of possibility for processes that have 
traditionally been held as exclusive and fundamentally characterizing human traits. We 
would not be applying the human to the environment, but rather finding the human to be 
already unconsciously dwelling in the environment. The arguments that we employed 
previously to explain the collapse of the internal/external distinction, however, are ample 
evidence that no such argument is being made here. Since it is possible to have cognitive 
processes and belief states that are wholly internal (e.g. situation 1), there is no 
relationship of dependence, only a kind of symbiotic complementarity. If we are to find 
what we are looking for, we must adapt this framework to allow for the dignity of 
quiddity for the object. 
Before turning to our section on phenomenology proper, I would like to borrow a 
quotation from Maurice Merleau-Ponty to suggest a way that we might adapt this 
framework. “[T]he object,” Merleau-Ponty states, “is seen from all times just as it is seen 
from all places, and by the same means, namely, the horizon structure. The present still 
holds in the hand the immediate past, but without positing it as an object, and since this 
immediate past likewise retained the past that immediately preceded it, time gone by is 
entirely taken up and grasped in the present.”89 In other words, what Merleau-Ponty 
seems to be gesturing toward is the fact that the object is immanently tied to its own 
historicity – that there is something in the nature of materiality that possesses a 
palimpsest quality, a “memory” of things previous. To say that an object might be 
characterized by memory may prima facie seem to be simply a slip-up, having forgotten 
for a moment our protestations against the reasons why anthropomorphization is a bad 
idea (self-aggrandization, superstition, divinization, romanticization, etc.). But we might 
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simply point out that, if we can successfully argue that the essence of the object is its 
memory-quality, then seeing this as an act of anthropomorphization is nothing more than 
an act of hubris. The fact that memory is traditionally considered to be a subjective 
experience may incline us to think that it is intrinsic to our mental faculties, but it could 
be the case that this is simply the very sort of symbiotic complementarity that we 
discussed above in the context of cognition and belief states, but with the roles reversed. 
Such a perspective is not without precedents. If we look further into Chalmers’ work, for 
instance, we can see that he picks up the thread of the extended mind in relation to the 
notion of experience. The best way to broach this subject seems to be by entering through 
his discussion of the intrinsic properties of physicality. Things, Chalmers argues, are 
determined by their relations to other things, both at the most macro and micro levels.90 
This is not meant to be taken as a grand existential statement about self-constitution and 
the Other, but rather the way that we understand and describe matter. Properties that we 
think of as being a fundamental possession of matter can be accurately understood as 
simply relational properties as applied to singular material instantiations. When we think 
of the mass of x, for instance, we think that this is a fundamental property of x: if my 
mass is 115 pounds, then I possess the fundamental property of having a mass of 115 
pounds. While this is not exactly untrue, however, it is simply a different (more intuitive) 
way of expressing a more technical fact: that my mass of 115 pounds determines the 
relative strength of my gravitational attraction to other bodies. The meaningful content of 
the concept of mass is essentially relational. The same can be said of smaller objects like 
particles.  
Now, as Chalmers sees it, the idea of the fundamental nature of physicality as being 
devoid of intrinsic properties – the world as “pure causal flux, with no further properties 
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for the causation to relate” – is not exactly intuitive.91 Such an idea imparts a sensation of 
metaphysical kenosis: in a world where the foundation of the world is simply an infinite 
process of deferral between coexisting bodies, the domain of ontology appears to be the 
phenomenology of the mirage. If we want the world to have substance, we need to locate 
these intrinsic properties; the only access that we have to them, however, is through 
intrinsic phenomenal properties (qualia) – properties as they appear to us through 
experience. Chalmers admits that it is beyond question that the leap from phenomenal 
properties as our mode of engaging the world to phenomenal properties as being 
somehow intrinsic properties of the physical is arbitrary – another form, perhaps, of 
Maslow’s hammer. However, he makes a good point that if we have no real idea of what 
we are looking for, any theory is hypothetically as good as any other – so the notion is, at 
very least, worth entertaining. The question, then, is this: how would an intrinsically 
phenomenal account of the physical work?  
Such an account, he rightly points out, smacks of a degree of panpsychism. If 
phenomenal properties inhere in the object, we are suggesting that the object is 
essentially phenomenal and we simply lack the faculties to appreciate it – like a sound, 
forever broadcasting just beyond our register, that is clear as a bell to a dog. Chalmers’ 
first response is, to use an apt metaphor, to switch (scopic) lenses: descend a level. Rather 
than consider phenomenal qualities of the physical, consider protophenomenal qualities 
of the physical. If protophenomenal properties inhere in an object, we are suggesting that 
the object is essentially characterized by properties that can jointly collaborate in such a 
way that they produce phenomenal effects – like being able to see the finished cake, if the 
ingredients come together, yet never knowing that it is the end result of the collusion of 
egg, flour, sugar, etc. Such an idea is still difficult to conceive of, naturally, since none of 
our standard physical properties can wield any explanatory power in this account, but it 
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“cannot be ruled out a priori.”92 The payoff would, furthermore, be great: a tidy 
contribution to our understanding of causation. “If there are intrinsic properties of the 
physical,” Chalmers explains, “it is instantiations of these properties that physical 
causation ultimately relates. If these are phenomenal properties, then there is phenomenal 
causation; and if these are protophenomenal properties, then phenomenal properties 
inherit causal relevance by their supervenient status, just as billiard balls inherit causal 
relevance from molecules.”93 Intrinsic protophenomenal qualities could thus accrue in 
such a way as to explain our own phenomenal experiences. This conversation cannot thus 
simply be relegated to an idle but ineffectual curiosity, for “the phenomenology of 
experience in human agents may inherit causal relevance from the causal role of the 
intrinsic properties of the physical.”94 
The major problem that we have glossed over here seems prominent. We want to 
motivate causation and save the substantial world by positing intrinsic physical qualities; 
we propose either phenomenal or protophenomenal qualities. But, as mentioned 
previously, Chalmers is forced to admit that such a conception cannot be understood 
within our current pool of physical properties. If there is an intrinsic phenomenal or 
protophenomenal quality to the object, it may as well be adamantium. Have we reached 
an impasse in terms of our attempt to adapt Clark and Chalmers’ framework of the 
extended mind? 
By introducing the notion of memory into the conversation, I would like to argue that it is 
possible to locate just this intrinsic property that Chalmers seeks in physical mutability. 
By highlighting parallels between intellectual (subjective) memory and physical 
(objective) mutability, we can see how we can craft a position whereby we fulfill our 
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earlier requirements to a) get at the object proper in a manner that allows us to b) 
investigate its intrinsic value without c) failing to respect its quiddity or d) prioritizing 
our self-interest or e) submitting to our own biophilia. If we can forge an argument that 
strengthens the consanguinity between these two versions of memory, we can a) access 
the object in its capacity as an object, and in so doing, b) accord it proper recognition for 
c) its originary work in enabling the construction of memory, a theory that d) in no way 
advantages or e) glorifies our own position in the world.  
The easiest entry point into the discussion may simply to be to frame this idea as simply 
the recognition of an oversight in Clark and Chalmers’ account. Situations 1, 2, and 3: 
Clark and Chalmers ultimately argue that, although each of these circumstances involves 
interacting with the environment in a certain way, the differences in these interactions are 
insignificant. We might point out, from a strictly empirical standpoint, that even the most 
internal of these circumstances (situation 1) is embedded in external data (i.e. intellectual 
processes are built on a foundation of an embodied and thus physical existence, since 
internal representations make reference to previous external referents). Furthermore, 
these intellectual processes – as Clark himself articulates – are evolved responses to 
environmental puzzles.95 We can then use this observation to build up our argument that 
links this intellectual quality inextricably to the material. In a follow-up to his and 
Chalmers’ landmark article, Clark responds to an inquiry about the role of coupled 
systems by commenting that coupling is not supposed to render the object cognitive, but 
rather to make it part of a cognitive system: it is “to make some object, that in and of 
itself is not usefully (perhaps not even intelligibly) thought of as either cognitive or non-
cognitive, into a proper part of some cognitive system, such as a human agent.”96 I intend 
to challenge – by worrying relevant conceptual terminology – the unintelligibility of a 
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cognitive object. Beyond a mere argument by association (between intellectual and 
physical matter), however, this argument will broach the question of how: how is it that 
mind and matter interface? The answer, I argue, is in memory. 
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4 “Incantative, Evocative Speaking”97: Phenomenology, 
Memory, and the Power of the Object 
Broadly speaking – assuming that human evolution is taken as a given, for one optimistic 
moment –  it does not seem contentious to claim that, if we consider our bodies to be a 
kind of “response” to an environmental prompt, then our minds must have likewise 
evolved. This mundane fact does not intend to commit us to any kind of social 
Darwinism or overriding determinism. It merely reiterates what many scholars, from 
within many disciplines, have been urging us to reflect upon for years: we can never 
transcend our particular intellectual embeddedness. Just as the liberal humanist subject 
can never quite escape the sticky residue of socio-cultural forces to become the sovereign 
self it so longs to be, the human organism can never quite escape its status as emergent – 
borne of the stuff of nature. Axiology, a two-pronged endeavor, can be seen as a response 
to this embeddedness: aesthetics sifting through the contents of human experience to find 
what is beautiful, and ethics sifting through the contents of human experience to find 
what is right. Such enterprises, however, can only ever be built on the shifting sands of 
human intuition and judgment, and the best that we can do in ethics is – through 
principles and heuristics – mark out a space where the ground seems most firm and build 
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a foundation of the soundest rationale available to us. We remain at the mercy of a 
trembling ground. 
Unearthing (or, perhaps, re-earthing) an ethics of the thing necessarily involves 
confronting such a truth, exposing the way in which our relationship with materiality is 
predicated upon pre-existing ideologies that prioritize subjectivity and its instrumental 
interests. It also, however, opens up the possibility of marking out new spaces to build 
new conceptions, which would in turn act as vectors for new ideologies. To formulate 
such a construction, however, we will need new blueprints that are responsive to our new 
terrain – that do not destine us to simply re-fabricate old goods on fresh soil. Such an 
approach will require a few key characteristics. It must be interested in the object for 
itself, in itself. It must minimize subjective interests and biases. We would like to borrow 
the essence – the ontological and epistemological novelties, as well as the spirit of the 
manifesto – of Bennett’s vital materialism, but with the inescapability of the extended 
mind thesis (à la Clark and Chalmers). It is, without a doubt, a tall order.  
It is with these requirements in mind that I suggest a turn to phenomenology (the study of 
phenomena, or things that appear to our conscious experience as they appear to our 
conscious experience).98 While such a movement might not be entirely intuitive, there are 
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many reasons to suggest that phenomenology offers us the clearest route to 
accomplishing our objective. One of the most notable items in the phenomenological 
vocabulary, for example, is “intentionality”: this term acknowledges that experiences are 
always directed toward something, or “about” something (the “intentional object”). This 
is not to say that, when we have an experience, we are limited to the perception of one 
entity: the object has a “horizonal structure,” both inner and outer, that extends beyond 
the limits of this original object to include, for example, its temporal dimension and other 
objects in close spatial proximity. Such thinking is a boon to the task at hand because it 
prioritizes the entrenchedness of subjective experience rather than casting it in the role of 
a high-flying deus ex machina; it implies that “experience and the world co-constitute 
one another,” although this world is one that the subject “never possesses in its 
entirety.”99 Not all aspects of phenomenology, however, are as easily integrated into our 
task. The major tension involved in such a choice, what we might term the “cautionary 
note” of phenomenology, pertains to the tension between the phenomenological reduction 
and its implications for the object. In our everyday interactions with objects, we tend to 
adopt what phenomenology terms the “natural attitude”: an unthinking acceptance of the 
reality of the world. To be clear, this is an unreflective metaphysical position: it is the 
assumption that what we perceive is not just perceptible, but really there, in the fullest 
sense of the phrase. But it is just these metaphysical assumptions that phenomenology 
looks to expunge from its practice. It does so through the central phenomenological 
mechanism (part of the larger phenomenological reduction) of “bracketing” or epoché, 
whereby the phenomenologist suspends all such judgments. Phenomenology is not 
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phenomenalism: it makes no strong claims about what is (or is not100) in the same way 
that phenomenalism asserts that physical objects are only perceptual “bundles.” From a 
phenomenalist perspective, objects attain a passive quality, and the crux of our interest is 
in analyzing their sense-content. Phenomenology, on the other hand, remains open to 
ontological commitments.101 It is interested in a more active approach to the object; the 
crux of our interest in phenomenology is in how these phenomena are constructed, which 
has intimate links to meaning-giving.102 That being said, there is clearly a difference 
between openness (i.e. suspension of both belief and disbelief) and support (i.e. 
declaration of belief), and phenomenology overtly falls under the former category. Why 
should we subscribe to a method that, far from the passions of, say, historical 
materialism, seems to only offer up a reserved handshake toward the object? 
My answer is short and sweet: precisely because of this reserved handshake (and a few 
extra “perks”). Given the tall order that we have placed, it seems unlikely that we can 
find a pre-existing methodology that does not have some kind of ideological baggage that 
in some way rubs up against our own. Phenomenology may throw up a wary hand at 
some of our basic ontological suppositions, but it does so with the intention of not 
overstepping any epistemological boundaries – a laudable rationale, for our project. 
Furthermore, we might at least note the possibility that passion is sometimes better put in 
the service of action than reason. Bennett is more than capable of providing us with rose-
colored glasses; what we are most in need of, for now, is a lens that filters out the 
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semiotic radiance of the object in favor of its “raw” appearance.103 In this respect, 
phenomenology seems like just the ticket. If what we want is an open comportment 
through which to hear the voice of materiality, phenomenology advocates a particularly 
well-suited attitude, variously described as “disciplined naïveté, bridled dwelling, 
disinterested attentiveness, and/or the process of attaining an empathetic wonderment in 
the face of the world [my emphasis].”104 It affords us “a low-hovering, in-dwelling, 
meditative philosophy that glories in the concreteness of person-world relations and 
accords lived experience, with all its indeterminancy and ambiguity, primacy over the 
known.”105 Equipped with first-person description and a conceptual vocabulary with 
which we can articulate the idiosyncrasies and intricacies of the object, then, we can 
perhaps peer more closely (if cautiously) at our conscious experience of the physical 
object and uncover “fresh, complex, rich descriptions of a phenomenon as it is concretely 
lived.”106 
Moreover, while strictly Husserlian phenomenology may have a few sharp thorns to 
brush past, I would argue that philosophers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty are 
fundamentally aligned with such a project. This is most obviously highlighted by 
Merleau-Ponty’s explanation of the value of the phenomenological reduction. Merleau-
Ponty’s take on this process mirrors closely his general uptake of phenomenology as a 
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way of exploring the relationship of the subject with its world. For Edmund Husserl, the 
phenomenological reduction hinges on an act of transcendence on the part of the subject, 
whereby “I am not negating this ‘world’ as though I were a solipsist; I am not doubting 
its factual being as though I were a skeptic; rather I am exercising the 
‘phenomenological’ έποχή which also completely shuts me off from any judgment about 
spatiotemporal factual being.”107 Without this act, no analysis can be properly 
phenomenological for Husserl.108 This is not quite the case for Merleau-Ponty. Such a 
transcendent turn, for him, belies the fact that our bodies are our primary means of 
knowing the world, and cannot be so simply cast aside – like an ornate hat that, though 
not without utility, obscures our vision with its excesses. It is only through our bodies 
that the world becomes intelligible, and such an intelligibility cannot help but have a kind 
of residue. He does not, as some suggest, dismiss the possibility of the reduction out of 
hand, commenting that it is “because we are through and through related to the world, the 
only way for us to catch sight of ourselves is by suspending this movement, by refusing 
to be complicit with it…. or again, to put it out of play.”109 In other words, the reduction 
is useful inasmuch as, in our attempt to complete the reduction, we are met by the world’s 
inextricability: when we have “reduced,” we realize that we just cannot reduce quite 
enough, and are confronted with the fact that this new phenomenological attitude – as a 
consequence of our embodiment – is merely a different comportment toward the world. 
“If we were absolute spirit,” Merleau-Ponty comments, “the reduction would not be 
problematic. But since, on the contrary, we are in and toward the world, and since even 
our reflections take place in the temporal flow that they are attempting to capture… there 
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is no thought that encompasses all of our thought [my emphasis].”110 Given that the body 
is our nexus between the subject and the object, such an attitude bodes well for us. His 
further comment that there is “an immanent or nascent meaning [sens] in the living body 
[that] extends… to the entre sensible world” that allows us to “discover the miracle of 
expression in all other ‘objects’” is also clearly in harmony with our aims.111 
It is not uncommon for scholars to point to Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time to 
indicate an entry point for 20th-century French phenomenology. No doubt this has more 
to do with a delicate madeleine soaked in lime-blossom tea than a phenomenological 
penchant for dinner parties and tawdry affairs. It is arguably not the most sensuous 
descriptive passage in his magnum opus –  here we might look to, for example, the 
“celestial hues” of asparagus with their “white feet – still stained a little by the soil of 
their garden-bed”112 – but it makes a strong case for being the most evocative. Starting 
with only a small, fluted sponge-cake, Proust lingers on and gently probes the nascent 
sensations induced by this petite dessert until an entire world springs forward – not just 
the world of “the water-lilies on the Vivonne and the good folk of the village,”113 but 
what in phenomenology is called a “lifeworld.” The lifeworld is not a set of objective 
relations between factual entities, but is the pre-reflective lived situation that comprises 
the setting of our everyday lives – “that experience of the world of which science is the 
second-order expression… to which every scientific determination is abstract, signitive, 
and dependent, just like geography with regard to the landscape where we first learned 
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what a forest, a meadow, or a river is.”114 In starting with the seed of the madeleine and 
cracking open a lifeworld, Proust’s account is not merely poignant, but gestures to 
Merleau-Ponty’s strong contention that “[t]he world is not an object whose law of 
constitution I have in my possession; it is the natural milieu and the field of all my 
thoughts and of all my explicit perceptions.” 115 The truths that are bodied forth from the 
madeleine appear through the madeleine because “[t]ruth does not merely ‘dwell’ in the 
‘inner man’ [sic]; or rather, there is no ‘inner man,’ man is in and toward the world, and it 
is in the world that he knows himself.”116 
It is with this in mind that we turn for a time to a first-person, descriptive account of the 
object through a kind of phenomenology of memory. A point of clarification may be 
helpful here. Why, one might wonder, if we are looking to get to the object, would we 
start with memory – arguably the most abstracted form of subjective experience? Does 
this not run entirely contrary to our current purpose, and would it not be preferable to 
take a more direct route – to develop a phenomenology of the object? In response to this, 
I would suggest that – despite the praiseworthiness of this commitment to grappling with 
objecthood in an immediate and unmitigated way – such a move would first of all run 
considerably more contrary to our current purpose, which is (in part) to respect the limits 
of our subjective capacities in regards to the powers of the object. Our mediated 
relationship with objects is an epistemological barrier, one that we can only hope to 
minimize by employing methodological strategies that string together the “its” and the 
“mes” – not assuming a kind of natural but forgotten equivalence between us. Memory is 
one such strategy. On a related note, acknowledging this distance is part of what enables 
us to then acknowledge that the object is not something that can be distilled and bottled 
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for human consumption, but can exceed our understanding and use (in Bennett’s terms, it 
has an “out-side” that presents itself as an epistemological limit117). Finally, it is my 
contention that such a project would simply be at odds with phenomenology’s aim. 
Phenomenology can help us understand structures of consciousness as they appear 
through experience; this is its purview. A phenomenology of the object is at best cryptic 
and at worst an extreme form of panpsychism: it would suggest that we are interested in 
working through the conscious experience of the object. While we are interested in 
expanding the extended mind theory, such an expansion – to claim that objects have 
conscious experience in the same way as the subject – is radical beyond the scope of my 
powers of justification. 
What is it like to experience a memory? Another lesson that Proust’s passage can teach 
us is that such an experience, while frequent and not in any way elusive, is much more 
ineffable than one might expect. I might think of Gruffy, the beloved stuffed animal 
mentioned in passing in a previous chapter, and posit him as the intentional object of my 
memory. I first need to withdraw from the natural attitude; I must bracket my impulse to 
impose external assumptions and frameworks upon the memory lest they color how this 
memory presents itself to me. It would not be right, phenomenologically speaking, to 
think of Gruffy as an assemblage of cotton, polyester, and plastic any more than it would 
be right to think of him as a symptom of alienated labor. If I could simply “close my 
eyes” (metaphorically and perhaps literally speaking), conjure its memory and have, 
entirely self-evident, its material construction manifest in my mind as a number of 
distinct substances, there would be a large burden taken off of the shoulders of the 
chemical sciences. Since it is, instead, the result of a scientific orientation toward the 
world, I must strip it away and be more attentive to the intentional object.  
A visual image, sketchy and incomplete, hovers at what feels like the very edge of my 
perceptual range. I see white hair that covers the expanse of an object that forms a 
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physical unity. It is matte, and thinner in some places than others, exposing some kind of 
rough beige underside to the object. I see black protrusions, horns, emerging from the top 
of the object. They too are uneven and patchy: black in places, but interspersed with more 
instances of this rough beige underside, and mottled – at times they appear black, but at 
times they actually appear grey, although my perception does not sharply demarcate 
between these elements of black and elements of grey, but rather instinctively averages 
out these shades so that they appear without close inspection to be natural variation. Two 
smooth black circles, glossy, adorn the face as eyes. 
But this memory is not merely visual, but affective. My memory of this object does not 
appear to me in isolation, but rather brings with it a number of emotional sensations. The 
primary sensation that I experience is positive: a warm, effusive impression of assurance 
that persists for as long as the visual remains. From where does this impression come? If 
I pause on this question and try to cultivate the affective purchase of the memory, I find 
that my mind lingers on certain aspects of the object. The sparseness of its hair and the 
patchiness of its flaking black paint seem to hold some kind of special draw; when I hold 
them in my thoughts, a number of new memories come to me, unbidden. Initially, they 
are vague: the feel of the soft white hair sliding between my fingers, or how it felt to have 
its horns between my teeth, soft and yielding with a small amount of stretch. But these 
vague memories point elsewhere: they, like smoke indicating a fire, are indexes of more 
extensive recollections. The sensation of stroking his hair segues into this same sensation 
as it was lived in a particular instantiation. It is the memory of, after an outbreak of lice at 
school, my mother’s insistence that we launder my stuffed animals. More affect: my 
pursuant dismay at the strange matted quality to its coat afterward, and my fixation on 
running my hands aggressively through it so that it might be fluffy again. Then a memory 
comes of the horns – a memory of one of many nights lying awake, edging on bored but 
for the moment simply idly contemplative, enjoying the strange, yielding mouth-feel of 
an elastic exterior drawn thin over a soft, springy interior as I contemplate the odd, 
Rorshach test-esque quality of my floral curtains. These memories, in turn, point me to 
others, which unfold from their own hazy visual representations. The firm line of my 
mother’s mouth as she collects my stuffed animals ushers forth an oppressive summer 
heat and the sinking of my soccer cleats into moist, loamy soil – I was refusing with 
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irritation her attempted administration of sunblock, which stung painfully when it 
mingled with sweat and dripped into my unsuspecting eyes. Resting in bed while idly 
contemplating my furnishings invokes my intense appreciation, as a child, of the 
sensation of coolness that comes from flipping over one’s pillow to access the side that 
had previously been pressed against the sheets – a wonderful sensation on sticky August 
nights. This process of deferral, moving from memory to memory, continues indefinitely. 
How might we consider such a process as different from perception? If we want to get a 
sense of the essence or eidos of a phenomenon, the critical second step in the 
phenomenological reduction is the eidetic reduction – a process wherein one effectively 
“beats around the bush,” imaginatively varying the intentional object, in an attempt to 
separate out the essential features from the dispensable. In many ways, perception seems 
to appear to us in the same way that memory does. Consider our previous example. If, 
instead of conjuring it in my mind, I simply place Gruffy in front of my vision with the 
correct phenomenological attitude, I end up with a similar result. The same constitution 
of thinning hair and patchy black spots appears to my consciousness visually, although its 
direct observation presents it to me as an exact image and not an imperfect 
representation. This level of exactness, however, does effect a change in the overall 
experience. As a direct object of perception, Gruffy now exerts a pull on me as a univocal 
whole, with no particular features standing out by demanding my attention. Certainly it is 
possible, if I wish to, to pay particular heed to these features, and – in so doing – inspire 
these same memories to be triggered. But this recall is only part of the perceptual process 
per accidens rather than per se, once removed from the process proper. It is the 
instigation of a separate phenomenon. We might, of course, choose to engage the object 
and, in so doing, provoke a change in it whereby its utility determines its focal points, but 
this too is to step outside of perceptual bounds. With an open and unimposing 
phenomenological attitude, I perceive this object as a fulsome possibility, while the 
transition into memory collapses this possibility into a succession of experiences. How 
this experiential quality is expressed is through highlighting of features of its appearance 
that are indexically tied to the experience. In our case, this is the sparseness of its hair and 
the flaking black quality of its horns, and – while both this sparseness and this flaking are 
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visible through perception – they are only imbued with significance through the 
recollection process. 
If our analysis, then, has indicated to us that there is a fundamental indexical quality to 
memory that stakes out its territory, then the next logical question might be to ask: how 
does memory achieve such a quality? What do our experiences of memory all share, 
inasmuch as they harken back to another time? The answer to this, I argue, is in physical 
mutability. A world in which physical mutability does not exist is a world in which the 
concept of memory is, if not impossible, then extraordinarily limited. This is because the 
concept of memory is fundamentally indebted to the concept of difference, which in turn 
carries with it the property of mutability. In a world of physical homogeneity, memory is 
meaningless. Memory turns on distinctions, which are what allows one to distinguish 
between different objects. If I am attempting to recall object a, which takes the shape of a 
square, I produce a mental representation constituted by four straight lines which meet 
four times at ninety degree angles. If I am attempting to recall object b, which is an 
equilateral triangle, I produce a mental representation constituted by three straight lines 
which meet three times at sixty degree angles. Memory assists me as I attempt to recall 
object a because it retains a blueprint of the form of object a. There is no problem yet. 
What happens, though, if we inhabit a world in which there is only the form of object a? 
Such a world is, of course, difficult to envision because of our innate capability to break 
down objects into component parts: object a, for instance, can be disassembled and re-
configured as straight lines, points, triangles, empty space, etc. Furthermore, our own 
mode of being in the world is as highly complex and mutable beings. If we overlooked 
this latter fact, however, and we were we capable of finding a unit of matter which can 
neither be added to nor further reduced and imagining it as metaphysical singularity, the 
observation at hand – that there would be no memory to recollect – would be intuitive. 
We previously noted that the body can be seen as a response to an environmental prompt; 
in a world where all is the same, there is no environmental prompt that would motivate a 
process of memory. A more phenomenological way of expressing this might be to say 
that homogeneity shatters the notion of the horizonal structure. The retention and 
protension of time cannot be observed, since time is only a kind of heuristic used to 
chronicle physical change induced by the flux of existence – of which there is none. We 
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cannot distinguish between the intentional object and objects that we are tacitly oriented 
toward because there are no markers by which to distinguish them.  
Of course, difference is not the same as mutability, it is just a predicate of mutability. Let 
us try to imagine a world in which there is difference but no mutability. At first, memory 
would seem to have a place: as our bodies engage with a world that appears to us in many 
different shapes, sizes, textures, etc., it would be useful to recall the differences between 
them during times when I am not directly engaged with them. However, we must here 
consider to what degree one can engage with an immutable object. Let us posit an object 
c. This can be any object within our experience – say, a tea cup. What can we do with this 
tea cup in an immutable universe? We might start by suggesting that we pick it up. Surely 
if there is an innocuous gesture that stops shy of non-engagement, it is to simply touch an 
object. But does such a touch not engender an effect? We might think of the ocean 
lapping gently at the sands of a beach. A calm, slow wave may well be more gentle than 
contact with a hand. Yet this gentle wave, over a great expanse of time, is irremediably 
responsible for acts of erosion that may cause a jagged surface to become smooth and 
polished. There is no denying that the end result is a material change. We might 
conclude, then, that engagement of such a world in any substantive way would be 
impossible. The notion of a world with difference but no mutability is therefore not 
livable. We might try to push this thought experiment to its limits, striving to imagine a 
world in which touch did not imply mutability. At this point, however, the thought 
experiment becomes too wildly outside of the realm of possibility. A world that embodies 
difference without mutability is already analogous to a conflict that embodies social 
disagreement without opinion. This further step breaks the fragile illusion of 
conceivability. 
Such an account inspires one particularly fair critique. In our example, we use a specific 
object to interrogate memory; this object is not the object of everyday memory, but 
instead has a distinctly nostalgic quality to it. Is it possible that we are simply 
equivocating between forms of memory in order to forge a link between two things that 
are of fundamentally different types? We might think of how we use memory most 
frequently in our lives. Much memory, it seems, does not have an unmotivated intentional 
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object attributed to it. It is much more likely, for instance, that I use my memory to recall 
the location of a stuffed animal than to simply recall it for reasons related to the intrinsic 
value of the memory act. In this respect, memory may seem more aligned with the type of 
perception discussed above, whereby the object presents itself as more of a fulsome 
possibility (future-oriented, univocal) than experiential (overdetermined, focal).  
A return to lived experience again may prove useful here. I have lost my object; my 
current objective is to locate it. What do I experience next? There is a vertiginous 
sensation of emptiness in my mind as I try to coax out not only a visual of the object 
itself, but my last perception of its outer horizon (e.g. those objects that, while not the 
intentional object, comprise its milieu). I might run through a list of circumstances in 
which I have used it. I might run through a list of other objects with which it is somehow 
complementary. These strategies assist me with provoking a recollection of my object in 
its current location. Either way, what I am invoking are different objects in different 
material situations, and it is this difference that will eventually lead me to my solution. It 
is the interaction of my objects with different objects and different contexts that makes it 
meaningful to me. With no difference, such a project is doomed to fail. As we noted, 
difference comes hand-in-hand with mutability: we might say that the possibility of 
difference is simultaneously its own promise. We again see that physical mutability is 
necessary to a coherent notion of memory.  
One final remark might be made. It is possible, of course, that we have memories that are 
directed toward objects that are not physical: the memory, for instance, of a spoken 
phrase. In fact, we could open this point up to any non-visual account of memory: a 
spoken phrase, but also a touch, smell, taste, etc. All of these can be intentional objects, 
but none of them are physical objects. How, then, can they bear the material traces of 
mutability that I posit are necessary for memory? We might again simply return to the 
idea of the error of trying to divorce any kind of information – including sensory – from a 
material basis. A spoken phrase is always issued from a body; touch is the interaction of 
two bodies as their spatial postitions overlap; a smell is an extramissionistic process 
initiated and completed by a body (often different); a taste can be described in much the 
same way as the last. These bodies can only ever exist through the same state of 
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difference that comes in tandem with mutability. Furthermore, such memories take the 
same shape as the memory described previously. A whispered word: in perception, it 
gestures to a meaning that can be taken up and lived by the subject. In memory, it 
manifests as a number of qualities that point to its material origin and experiential quality 
(e.g. the timbre of its vocal origin and this timbre’s particular horizonality). While less 
overtly obvious, non-physical intentional objects still ultimately refer to physical 
referents which exhibit an indebtedness to physical mutability, and this natural state of 
reference is obvious in how they unveil themselves to the subject. 
Having established the primacy of physical mutability to the process of memory, all that 
remains is to step outside of our phenomenological attitude to address the question of 
primogeniture. We have said that we cannot think of memory without physical 
mutability: is it fair to say that subjective memory “owes” itself to physical mutability? 
Not only would I answer in the affirmative, but it seems to me that physical mutability 
could be considered a weak form of memory in itself. This is not to say that matter is a 
kind of interactive skeleton upon which subjective memory is progressively layered. 
While it is true that we take advantage of the object’s ability to bear the weight of our 
experience, the fact of this ability seems to point to something intrinsic to the object that 
possesses an originary memory-quality. In Bodies that Matter, Judith Butler argues that it 
is the very material quality of bodies that lends them importance – bodies both matter 
(i.e. are expressed as tangible objects) and matter (i.e. have significance and value), and 
these two facts are tightly knit together. “Insofar as matter appears… to be invested with 
a certain capacity to originate and to compose that for which it also supplies the principle 
of intelligibility,” she states, “then matter is clearly defined by a certain power of 
creation and rationality that is for the most part divested from the more modern 
deployments of the term [my emphasis].”118 Such thought is in alignment with 
longstanding ways of thinking of matter, including the Aristotelian conception in which 
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matter is “neither a simple, brute positivity or referent nor a blank surface or slate 
awaiting an external signification,” but instead is the pure potentiality upon which 
actuality is made possible through the imposition of form.119 If we see this power of 
creation and rationality as inherent in the object, and closely linked (as we previously 
noted) to the ideas of potentiality and actuality (or possibility and experience), is it such a 
stretch to see this inherent quality as attached to the natural transformative propensity of 
materiality at large? The inner horizonal structure of the object is in part comprised of the 
retention and protension of itself inside of temporality; such a retention and protension is 
evidenced partially by material changes to the object, rendering it a kind of palimpsest 
through which an object is simultaneously a single appearance and a body of historical 
evidence that is muted (though always present and active, though not silenced) by the 
limitations of material presentation. In this way, we can argue that there is a sense in 
which the object holds more in cognitive properties than Clark and Chalmers can offer 
(i.e. part of a coupled system responsible for limited belief states): it also, in its physical 
mutability, embodies a form of memory that presages and enables subjective memory.120 
We might refer to this memory-quality as a protophenomenal property – much as Bennett 
refers to those nonsubjects who exhibit a quiet agency as “protoactants.”121 
Where does this leave us, in terms of our project? The idea of memory being 
inextricably bound up with matter, I argue, leaves us with a more practical way of 
conceptualizing matter in order to reap the ethico-political and pragmatic benefits that 
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Bennett has in her sights. I do not contest that matter is agentic – that it operates in 
mysterious ways that human hubris would do well to respect. I would even suggest that 
the current version of the vitality of matter merely seeks to characterize this agency, and 
that Bennett’s text briefly skirts such an idea without exploring its full ramifications.122 
Bennett’s chosen formula, however, leaves the average person not only struggling against 
a notion of agency that counters that of common sense, but offers little in the way of a 
mechanism for appreciating its veracity. In a memory-focused account, on the contrary, 
we find ourselves constantly in the presence of physical triggers that are more or less 
obvious given our comportment and/or their removal from the physical object, but that 
are always constitutionally part of our experience. The powers of the object (or thing-
power), still silent and mysterious, now shoot through our very being.  
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with the use of stone tools because the materiality of the tool acted as an external 
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5 Conclusion (Paging Epimetheus: From Dyspraxia to 
Eupraxia) 
Accounts of matter as lively are hardly a new scholarly fashion, and are not restricted to 
materialism proper. Ancient Greeks, in early efforts to explain phenomena, frequently 
partook of material monism, seeing in matter life forces fit to fashion a world. For Thales 
of Miletus, it was water: divine and creative, it suffused and enlivened all. For 
Anaximenes, the arche was instead air, which rarefied and condensed in order to produce 
the diversity of distinct physical entities that we see around us. Heraclitus instead opted 
for fire as “the thunderbolt [that] steers the totality of things.”123 These particular views 
are known as hylozoism: the belief that matter (hylo-) is endowed with life (zōē ), or – 
perhaps less jarring to contemporary sensibilities – that life and matter are inseparable.  
But this notion is anything but antiquated. The Italian Renaissance introduced into the 
philosophical lexicon the term panpsychism; this somewhat stronger hypothesis, which 
contends that consciousness (or mind/spirit) permeates everything without exception, has 
aroused considerable interest since its inception, and is enjoying a popular resurgence in 
contemporary philosophy of mind. The tricky problem of emergentism in physicalist 
accounts of reality and the general (and ancient) maxim that one “can’t get anything from 
nothing” (ex nihilo nihil fit) lend panpsychism a great deal of explanatory appeal, and – 
far from a niche New Age belief – it has been adapted and refined by a variety of notable 
scholars in fields as diverse as theology (e.g. David Ray Griffin) and neuroscience (e.g. 
Christof Koch). This is not even to mention conceptualizations of vital matter that speak 
through, for example, pantheism – which in turn reminds us that such a recapitulation 
entirely excludes the rich intellectual histories beyond the Western canon. 
Yet, for all of these accounts of a vibrant matter, we still struggle to respect matter as 
being substantial in light of its substance. As a species, our relationship with our physical 
environment can be described as problematic at best. Since the arrival of the Industrial 
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Revolution and the increased levels of atmospheric pollution that came alongside its 
technological advances, we have struggled to achieve a relationship with our environment 
that reflects its value and the necessity of sustainable practices. Biocentric concerns – 
while legitimate and attention-worthy in their own right – often overshadow the precarity 
of the physical substrate that enables and conditions biological existence. Unfortunately, 
even these biocentric concerns are ill-addressed as prevalent ideologies – including socio-
cultural norms, political viability, and financial interests – compete against them and 
ultimately, in their short-term allure, win out.  This problem is only exacerbated by our 
attitude toward our newfound industrial capabilities. In the 21st century, we have the 
means to create and replicate the instruments essential to human comfort more 
efficiently, reliably, and lastingly than ever before. While we have harnessed the efficient 
and reliable aspects of these means, however, we have propagated a consumer culture 
that encourages ephemeral items that pass only fleetingly through our lives before either 
planned obsolescence or passing fashion designates them garbage. Landfills comprised of 
masses of plastic baby diapers and water bottles testify as to how quickly things pass 
from their initial state of specialized, pristine consumer product to purposeless, pervasive 
trash. 
Of course, the physical universe needs no subject to persist and thrive. Were we to utterly 
and irremediably degrade our planet to the point that it could no longer engender and 
maintain life, material existence would not simply cease. It would, if you will forgive the 
colloquialism, “keep on keepin’ on.” But while the universe would appear 
overwhelmingly similar, given that we are an incredibly minute presence in an 
unthinkably vast astronomical picture, there is still an extraordinarily large amount that 
could be lost.  Human history is shackled to its material substrate. There is no 
disembodied database that will hold our struggles and successes, that will encapsulate our 
frail but beautiful lives: such information is expressed through the navigation of these 
lives through their worlds, and the imprint that this navigation leaves. The Earth is our 
database, and we inscribe it with our bodies.  If we annihilate the Earth’s diversity and 
complexity, then we annihilate the diversity and complexity of own stories. This, too, is 
only the most self-centered point of consideration. It does not even touch on the billions 
of years of history that predate the brief if conspicuous genesis of Homo sapiens sapiens. 
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We have learned, through excavating practices, about the kinds of beings that came 
before us and their own conditions of life.  This, too, is at risk. While this information can 
be found in biological organisms (e.g. tree rings), it is also richly evidenced in non-
biological substances (e.g. sediment), and neither is immune to human activity.124 
What we need, then, is not merely a new conception of matter – novelty is not the 
concern here. What we need is a conception of matter that acknowledges it as something 
more than merely “stuff,” and that will present itself to us so naturally that we cannot 
help but bring it to mind not only in our moments of cerebral abstraction, but in our 
moments of pragmatic interaction. We need to be able to peer at the most mundane of 
things – our toothbrushes, our writing desks – and see, staring back at us, more than a 
thing with which to x. Such thinking, while not without weight, has not served us well so 
far, and I agree with Bennett that “the image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized 
matter feeds human hubris and our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and 
consumption.”125 Furthermore, we need to see more in the object than second-hand 
echoes of our own subjectivity, or a means to further our own interests. Our tendency to 
project ourselves ever-outward rarely provides a sound basis for a balanced investigation 
of something fundamentally other, if (thankfully) complementary. The power of alterity 
resides in the fact that there is a gap between two things; we are doing both ourselves and 
the object of inquiry a disservice in collapsing this gap and thereby obliterating all of the 
implications that it has for the constitution of both parties. The power of a self-serving 
attitude is in accomplishing personal objectives. While it is true that to entirely escape 
self-interest is impossible in light of the fact that values and perspectives are subjective in 
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nature, limiting the degree to which we gear into this self-interest will give us a clearer 
view from which we will ultimately, if not immediately, benefit. This is the formula 
which I drew up to re-frame the thing for the good of the thing. This, I believe, is what I 
have done. 
While Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter can be seen as an ideal springboard for such a 
project, her own prescription is generous with the theory and sparing with the praxis. 
Bennett implores us to seriously consider how seeing thingness as an agentic force might 
affect our political analyses and, in so doing, have a positive impact on lived realities. It 
is not that Bennett does not understand the ethico-political heft of the situation at hand: 
her text explicitly acknowledges that the ontological and epistemological threads that 
weave through her text are loaded with ethical and political implications, and these 
implications are in fact its driving force. When considering her contribution as a whole, 
however, it appears that these weaving threads are often manipulated by a forgetful hand, 
and get all too easily caught up in stitching together disparate ideas into a concordant and 
attractive portrait of a demos of thingness. While Vibrant Matter is peppered with 
contemporary events and issues that complement Bennett’s undertaking, exploration of 
the intersection of these events and issues through her theoretical framework at times 
feels more like an end than a means to an end, and this sense of the weak effectuality of 
her work is amplified by the relatively cursory way in which she uncertainly deliberates 
its implementation. This criticism is concisely pinpointed by one detractor, who 
comments that it “leaves the political – if not political theory – undercooked.”126  
None of this, however, is to say that the intellectual work of Vibrant Matter must be 
discarded as cheap rhetoric. On the contrary, I would agree with Nicky Gregson that 
“Vibrant Matter shows Bennett to be a generous, humane, humble and honest scholar,” 
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and the fact that her preferred authorities include the likes of Spinoza and Deleuze 
indicate that her alignment with political philosophy is here merely more philosophical 
than political – an orientation for which there should be no shame or reprimand.127 What 
it does suggest, however, is that we need to look elsewhere if our priority is constructing 
an account that has both (intellectual) rigor and (pragmatic) resonance. Where we should 
look, of course, depends on what we see as the key obstacle to such a pragmatic 
resonance. Drawing from Bennett’s text, I agree that action-oriented perception – the way 
in which objects present themselves to us as fundamentally suited for practical usage – 
poses a challenge to understanding the object as more than just the passive buttress of 
subjective experience, and further argue that such an obstacle is made all the more 
insuperable by its natural and instinctual qualities. Embedded in the way that we 
perceive the external world is the seed of an all-encompassing concern for utility. Our 
problem, then, is finding a means of thinking materiality that is also natural and 
instinctual, if somewhat less apparent. We seek, for now, to become (to borrow some 
Heideggarian terminology) neither lords of beings nor shepherds of Being, but rather 
farmers of both, re-seeding a solution to the subject-object problem that hybridizes 
objects and subjects in a way that maintains the distinction of two different strains while 
seeing in their collaboration only the overpowering asset of a resultant lifeworld. 
By looking to Clark and Chalmers’ landmark article on extended mind theory, I posit that 
seeing the external environment as agentic in the sense that it has a mind-like quality as a 
useful first step to honoring such a priority. Discourse on the subject has traditionally 
revolved around, in one way or another, the prized position of the subject as the possessor 
of mind – expressed divinely (i.e. as spirit) or secularly (i.e. as consciousness), but 
always as something wondrous. It is this perceived lack on the part of the object that 
paves the way for a hierarchial valuation system that puts it at a natural disadvantage. If 
we can seal the rift of this chasm and bridge the subject and the object, we might gain 
some headway in horizontalizing this relationship. Of course, artificially inducing what 
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we might call a “mental physical object” would be an unforgivable contradiction of our 
aims, which are not to assimilate the object into human culture, but rather to foster a 
culture of the object that highlights the unique capacities that arise out of its unique way 
of being in the world. What Clark and Chalmers help us realize, however, is that there is 
no level of artifice involved in devising such an object. Where the artifice truly lays, on 
the contrary, is in framing cognition as a subjective process that happens wholly within 
the confines of the human head – a tendency that they refer to as the “hegemony of skin 
and skull.” If we can recognize the importance of coupled systems – how, for example, 
my iPhone cooperates with cognitive processes in order to retain and retrieve 
information, and how this information can be said to embody limited forms of belief 
states – then we can fashion a compelling argument for how objects, free of any sleight of 
hand, take on a mental quality.  
The problem with Clark and Chalmers’ argument is not intrinsic to its content, but rather 
pertains to its limitations and methodology. They simply do not go far enough, and the 
distance that they do traverse is thickly sedimented with an anthropocentric style of 
thinking. Of course, such an approach cannot inspire reproach when the primary interest 
is means of cognizing: it is, inarguably, the right tool for the right job. Our job, however, 
is slightly different than their own, and we must take what valuable lessons we can and 
amend them accordingly. Chalmers’ own work goes somewhat further than the work that 
came out of his collaboration with Clark, and in looking at his thought regarding intrinsic 
qualities of physicality, we can append to the extended mind theory the notion of 
protophenomenal qualities. We cannot bear the idea that there is nothing to physicality 
that defines it – that the world is essentially empty, just consisting of the free play of 
baseless interactions. At the same time, we struggle with the problem of emergentism: 
how consciousness seems to have spontaneously arisen out of a physical medium that 
exhibits no properties of consciousness. One possible solution to this problem is 
protophenomenal qualities: qualities that are intrinsic to physical objects that, taken 
additively, produce the phenomenal qualities that we as subjects experience. In this way, 
our physical environment would be steeped in experience, and the mental feature of the 
subject that has traditionally been seen to “separate the wheat from the chaff,” from an 
ontological perspective, would be recognized as belonging most properly to the object – 
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or the chaff. This, however, does leave us with a rather large question mark hanging in 
the foreground. It is easy to postulate protophenomenal properties; it is entirely another 
thing to identify them. Since the prize of such an identification is, after all, elucidation on 
the topic of how we might see the object as even more mind-like, can we speculate on 
what these protophenomenal properties might be? 
My answer to this is that we should look to the memory-quality of objects in order to find 
something akin to a protophenomenal property. Adopting a phenomenological attitude 
toward memory can help us understand how memory is not, in fact, a “storehouse whose 
stores are nothing stored nowhere,” but rather a process that relies heavily on the 
characteristic of physical mutability.128 When I perceive an object, my mind paints an 
impressionistic image that I later use in recall. But this image is not univocal, and my 
experiences in the world bear material traces, which then manifest in memory as 
compelling features onto which one latches and propels oneself through past experience. 
This process is most obvious in visual memory, but its primordial form can be traced to 
any account of memory that relies on difference, which we cannot ever practically 
divorce from mutability – what we might re-frame as the capacity to engender difference. 
Given that our senses rely on distinctions in order to operate, we can justly say that this 
circumscribes all accounts of memory. By drawing parallels between the physical object 
and how its mutable form bears witness to past experience and subjective memory, which 
does much the same thing, it is possible to conceive of a kind of “material memory” that 
enables our own. We might call this a nostalgic account: an account that recognizes in the 
practice of memory a sense in which we all feel the pain of longing (algos) to go home 
(nostos) – our home in the material object from whence we all spring. 
We have insisted on the pressing nature of finding a way of envisaging memory that is 
new and yet livable. Unlike many academic enterprises, the main challenge of this has 
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not been having insufficient data on the object of investigation, but rather too much. How 
we relate to materiality reflects a long and burgeoning history that has adhered so well 
that it is difficult to tell where the object ends and where the ideology begins. 
Furthermore, even if we can get through that thick paint of subjectivity, we feel 
powerless in determining what new veneer we ought to apply in order to emphasize its 
natural lustre without altering its natural hue. We feel a certain amount of sympathy for 
Meno, who – in the Platonic dialogue of the same name – asks Socrates: “How are you 
going to search for [the nature of virtue] when you don’t know at all what it is, Socrates? 
Which of all the things you don’t know will you set up as target for your search? And 
even if you actually come across it, how will you know that it is that thing which you 
don’t know?”129 We know, from the perspective of hindsight, that the way that we 
interact with our material environment is far from ideal: we see symptomatic effects 
everywhere. Yet it is hard to see how a solution might unfold from the problem, and – in 
the event that it does – how we would recognize it as a solution. For Plato, the solution to 
finding the essence of virtue was anamnesis: recognizing truth that was never gone, but 
only forgotten. In the same way, we might contend that seeing matter as memory is 
something that we all intuitively understand, but have never come to fully appreciate. The 
beauty of such an account is that, as in the case of Meno, there is no complicated 
knowledge of physics required in order to recall what we have forgotten: given the right 
conditions, the right mindset, and perhaps a small gadfly, one can come to these 
conclusions independently. By using phenomenology, we have ensured that it is only the 
contents of experience that bring us to the essence of memory.  
Of course, reconceptualizing matter is only a necessary first step in effecting change at a 
societal level. The consumerism (i.e. economic materialism) that dominates Western 
culture, for instance, is not simply a bad habit that we might break at will – like chewing 
our nails or, perhaps more suitably, picking at a scab. The Joneses with whom we must 
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keep up with have been around since before the turn of the 20th century. Thorstein 
Veblen, in his 1899 text Theory of the Leisure Class, penned an early account of such 
practices, remarking that “[c]ustomary expenditure must be classed under the head of 
waste in so far as the custom on which it rests is traceable to the habit of making an 
invidious pecuniary comparison – in so far as it is conceived that it could not have 
become customary and prescriptive without the backing of this principle of pecuniary 
reputability or relative economic success. It is obviously not necessary that a given object 
of expenditure should be exclusively wasteful in order to come in under the category of 
conspicuous waste.”130 In other words, economists and sociologists have been observing 
for well over a century a prevailing attitude in which an item’s value accords to the 
degree to which it represents an enviable social status – a valuation system that Veblen 
refers to as one of “conspicuous waste,” and which feeds into irresponsible resource 
consumption. His second point – that such an item need not be entirely purposeless in 
order to be wasteful – is a careful and particularly germane one. While it serves a 
primarily clarifying purpose in his explanation, it also gestures to an especially poignant 
truth in the 21st century: that, below an overzealous consumer mentality, there trickles a 
thin stream of logos that lends a weak credence to this zeal. A plastic baby diaper, for 
instance, hardly seems like a luxury item, designed as it is to dispose of urine and fecal 
matter. A single-use water bottle, too, is a delivery system for a life-sustaining substance. 
Yet it is the disposability of these items that mark them with the dark sign of waste. If 
they no longer smack of “invidious pecuniary comparison,” then it is simply because over 
a century of consumerism has both dramatically increased the variety and availability of 
goods and substantially heightened (and normalized) purchasing baselines. The quiet 
whisper of consumerist logic reasons that the diaper and the bottle are essential to 
hygiene and health. It is hard to hear the counterplea of sustainability with its antithesis 
plastered on television screens, department store flyers, and through online marketing. 
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The political climate for environmental change at this time also appears quite bleak. 
There was a time – a recent one – where environmentalism was seen as a “motherhood 
and apple pie” issue: the sort of system of values that was widespread if not universal, 
and to which no respectable community-minded individual could reasonably object. 
What once was derided as “treehugger mentality” came, over the course of several 
decades, to be identified (in a mild form, at least) as a baseline level of care exhibited by 
a conscientious citizen. Who was not enthused at the prospect of clean energy and the 
electric car in the early 2000s? An entire style of rhetoric emerged around “going green” 
with sustainable practices, and toting along reusable bags to the grocery store became not 
only a common practice, but sometimes public policy.131 In the wake of recent economic 
downturns, however, environmental concern seems to be less pressing and less persistent, 
occupying a more peripheral place in mainstream values and spiking mainly in the 
shadow of singular “focusing events,” which create a “push” for political agendas and 
legislative change (e.g. the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
disaster).132 Of course, it is difficult to measure environmental sentiment – and what 
measurements we can procure have limited power to offer an exhaustive interpretation. 
While studies of public opinion can offer us hard, quantitative evidence, it can be difficult 
to shape this raw data into a well-supported narrative. What we can say is that, in a 2014 
Greendex survey, Canada and the U.S. both showed decreased levels of sustainability in 
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relation to previous surveys.133 This flagging attentiveness to environmental issues, 
furthermore, cannot be attributed to a particularly keen historical commitment that simply 
set an ambitiously high bar: the nations ranked 17th and 18th out of 18 nations, 
respectively.134 While the environment is certainly not off of our value radar yet, it is 
inching closer to the fringes, and only an effective, targeted, and sustained effort to re-
invigorate environmental awareness is likely to ameliorate the situation. 
Such an effort – to go beyond what we can realistically identify as armchair reasoning, 
and push more forcefully toward translation into lived experience – remains, alas, beyond 
the confines of this monograph. In recognizing this as a shortcoming of this research, 
however, we must not shortchange the power of the text. If we borrow again Foucault’s 
notion of productive power, we can see that bodies are never entirely free of nor entirely 
bound by an authoritarian, superior power; rather, bodies shape and re-shape according to 
the circulation of texts within larger bodies of discourse, which construct and re-construct 
the norms that embody and exude power. Similarly, we might see that – with enough 
texts – a changed discourse on thingness might stimulate new norms that exert influence. 
If we need convincing, we might reflect on the fact that “[i]n the beginning was the 
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” – the ultimate testimony to 
the power of the text if ever there was one.135 The difference between this conception of 
matter and that of Bennett’s, pragmatically speaking, is not that this account is somehow 
magically self-seeding, but rather that its more intuitive character makes it more easily 
adapted and discussed within other frameworks – giving its ideals a longer shelf life. An 
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analysis of the object such as this lends itself especially well to future research in the area 
of critical discourse analysis. As an approach to discourse that emphasizes the co-
constitution of language and social practice, such a direction could probe how our 
treatment of the object as something naturally bare that has a human telos imposed upon 
it is reflected within the structures, meanings, and practices of language itself, and use 
these insights to continue the objectives of this work. We might thereby equip ourselves 
against, for instance, “[p]olitical spin doctors and corporate public relations departments 
[that], having mastered the art of ‘green speak,’ reassure us that our environmental 
concerns, as real as they are, are being handled attentively,” and that we can “continue to 
drive our SUV’s [sic] to fast-food franchises in support of the global beef market without 
any need for alarm or personal sacrifice.”136 While I am careful to note that there is a real 
moral difference between the words we use to describe other members of our human 
community – members that we can accord the full rights and privileges of personhood – 
and the words we use to describe non-sentient beings, it is also worth pointing out that 
the cultural force of language re-labeling and re-appropriation in marginalized 
communities attests to the potential of a sensitive and/or adapted vocabulary. At a more 
macro level, consideration as to how the way that we talk about materiality can be echoed 
from within an interdiscursive context may glean some insights on how power structures 
propagate. This could provide a compelling case for how an investigation of the object 
qua object can still offer valuable insights for humanist projects.  
On a sunny Tuesday afternoon on 4 June in the grate over the storm drain to the 
Chesapeake Bay in front of Sam’s Bagels on Cold Spring Lane in Baltimore, Jane 
Bennett managed to accomplish something as beautiful as it was important. It was not a 
feat of intellect, although its intellectual consequence was considerable. Nor was it a feat 
of strength, although its effect was powerful. On that sunny afternoon, Jane Bennett 
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spontaneously achieved an elusive and ephemeral skill: the ability to speak the language 
of things. Bennett worries, in her text, about the problem of language, which raises its 
head like a Lernaean Hydra – for each signifier that emerges from our vocabulary from 
which she tries to rub out a human face, two new faces appear to spring. It might bode 
well for Bennett to take heed of the words of Merleau-Ponty, who insists that we will 
never come to the truth unless we “return to this origin, so long as we do not rediscover 
the primordial silence beneath the noise of words, and so long as we do not describe the 
gesture that breaks this silence. Speech is a gesture, and its signification is a world.”137 
Merleau-Ponty was, in fact, discussing the truth of “man [sic],” but the point remains a 
compelling one, if we maintain that the world and the subject are co-constituting. If we 
probe deeply enough, we find that our words cannot ever quite escape their natural 
underpinnings, no matter how ruthlessly anthropocentric we become; before these words, 
there was only a fulsome (human) silence in which objects spoke for themselves. In this 
sense, the language of things is both the easiest and most difficult to acquire. We may 
need words – specialized words, perhaps – to get there, but our own silence is our 
destination. With an ounce of humility, a gram of reflection, and a small measure of 
memory, we too might manage to hear our mother tongue, and – in so doing – pay proper 
respects to our universal material homeland. 
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